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Introduction 
The intense political and economic turmoil in Venezuela throughout the administration of 
Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro has engendered the most severe humanitarian crisis in the 
Western Hemisphere today, an outflux of approximately 4.8 million refugees from the country 
since 2014, and an international controversy over the legitimacy of Maduro’s presidency.1 In the 
aftermath of the contentious 2018 presidential election in Venezuela, opposition leader Juan 
Guaidó contested Maduro’s authority and has received the political recognition of more than 50 
countries that consider him Venezuela’s rightful president.2 This political dispute puts the 
governments of countries such as the United States and several European countries, which have 
recognized Guaidó as Venezuela’s president, at odds with the governments of countries like 
Russia and China, which recognize Maduro.3 Amid such a crisis, governments, international 
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have provided conflicting arguments 
about how Venezuela’s political crisis should be resolved in accordance with international law. 
To provide insights into the historical and theoretical foundations of such discordant 
arguments, this thesis analyzes the political writings of the sixteenth-century Spanish friar 
Bartolomé de las Casas, whose denunciations of Spanish treatment of indigenous peoples during 
colonization efforts in the Caribbean addressed international legal questions relevant to the 
present-day Venezuelan crisis. Las Casas’s writings offer insights into the historical precedents 
behind the international legal arguments that governments and international organizations invoke 
concerning Venezuela. Also, Las Casas’s political thought articulates a perspective on 
 
1 “Venezuela crisis: How the political situation escalated,” BBC, last modified January 13, 2020, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36319877.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
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international legal questions that can be used to support or critique the arguments and policies of 
governments, international organizations, and NGOs concerning the Venezuelan turmoil. Las 
Casas’s arguments against Spanish injustices toward Native Americans in the Caribbean are 
especially pertinent to the study of the Venezuelan crisis because the ongoing political and 
economic strife in Venezuela leaves that country’s population at risk for potential crimes against 
humanity. This possibility, and the questions it poses regarding Maduro’s legitimacy if he were 
to carry out crimes against humanity against Venezuelan citizens, makes the study of 
international legal and ethical questions such as those Las Casas posed all the more critical for 
the study of the Venezuelan crisis. 
The thesis seeks to determine how well twenty-first-century governments, international 
organizations, and NGOs’ arguments and policy positions concerning the Maduro regime’s 
parallel themes from Las Casas’s writings. With a recognition of the differences in the historical 
contexts of Las Casas’s day and the current Venezuelan crisis, the paper aims to find to what 
extent Las Casas’s political thought aligns with twenty-first-century governments’ justifications 
for international interventions. The document uses the term “international interventions” to refer 
to governments’ efforts to exert influence on the direction of political changes in another country 
– especially when the country in question is in crisis. Thus, the thesis speaks of international 
interventions in a broader sense than as a reference to governments’ or international 
organizations’ military involvement in armed conflicts within other countries’ territories. To 
provide helpful historical and theoretical context for Las Casas’s views on international 
interventions as defined in this broader sense, this analysis compares his political thought with 
that of two other sixteenth-century Spanish writers. Like Las Casas, these writers – Francisco de 
Vitoria and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda – sought to answer pressing legal and ethical questions 
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concerning Spanish colonization in the Americas. The arguments these two writers employed to 
address these questions illuminate Las Casas’s views in greater detail through comparisons and 
contrasts, providing a more nuanced understanding of how Las Casas’s political thought fit into 
the international legal theories of his day. The writings of Vitoria in particular have wielded great 
influence on the development of international legal thought on state sovereignty, as well as 
“modern constitutionalism, subjective rights, and imperialistic discourse.”4 The thesis focuses on 
Las Casas’s thought and analyzes the writings of Vitoria and Sepúlveda to a secondary degree in 
part because Las Casas’s political thought tends to be related less directly than that of Vitoria to 
international legal principles of sovereignty and international interventions that apply critically to 
the Venezuelan crisis.5 Instead, Las Casas’s political arguments tend to be regarded more 
commonly as critiques of oppression in colonization and imperialism, and these characterizations 
of Las Casas’s thought are certainly justified.6 However, Las Casas’s political arguments provide 
important insights for the study of sovereignty and international interventions as well, and this 
study seeks to demonstrate the moral and practical applicability of certain views in Las Casas’s 
writings to international efforts to address the Venezuelan crisis. The thesis’s comparisons of Las 
Casas’s arguments to those of Vitoria and Sepúlveda serve to articulate the differences in these 
writers’ perspectives on sovereignty and international interventions, and they illustrate 
particularly how certain views of Vitoria are more applicable to the circumstances of the 
Venezuelan crisis than those of Las Casas and how other views of Las Casas are more applicable 
to the Venezuelan crisis than those of Vitoria. 
 
4 Toy-Fung Tung, “Vitoria’s Ideas of Supernatural and Natural Sovereignty: Adam and Eve’s Marriage, the Uncivil 
Amerindians, and the Global Christian Nation,” Journal of the History of Ideas 75, no. 1 (January 2014), accessed 
March 10, 2020, https://www-jstor-org.echo.louisville.edu/stable/43289650, 46. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Bartolomé de las Casas, “An Account, Much Abbreviated, of the Destruction of the Indies,” in An Account, Much 
Abbreviated, of the Destruction of the Indies, With Related Texts, ed. Franklin W. Knight, trans. Andrew Hurley 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003), l. 
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 The document adopts a case-study approach to the study of the intersections between the 
international legal and ethical arguments in Las Casas’s writings and the legal and ethical 
arguments governments and international organizations employ in the context of the Venezuelan 
crisis. The first section of the thesis elaborates on the context of the current Venezuelan crisis, 
surveying its causes and how the crisis raises questions about international legal principles like 
sovereignty and the responsibility to protect. These principles contribute to the ongoing 
international disagreements among governments regarding the Maduro regime’s political 
legitimacy. This section of the thesis provides explanations of sovereignty and the responsibility 
to protect as international legal principles and norms, placing them in the context of legal 
precedents and controversies. The second part of the thesis introduces Las Casas’s perspective on 
sovereignty and concepts of just war theory. Just war theory examines the justifications for a 
legally permissible war and whose principles can be applied to non-military efforts of 
governments to influence political events in another government’s territory.7 This section of the 
thesis seeks to provide crucial context concerning Las Casas’s political arguments that will prove 
crucial for further analysis throughout the thesis.  
The third segment of the thesis delves further into the evolution of views of sovereignty 
and just war theory in international law. This part of the thesis compares and contrasts Las 
Casas’s views of international interventions with the twenty-first century concept of the 
responsibility to protect, which this section explains in detail. Furthermore, this section 
introduces crucial comparisons of the political thought of Las Casas, Vitoria, and Sepúlveda that 
are pertinent to the conclusions of the thesis. Following this discussion, the fourth section of the 
 
7 Alex J. Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Just War Tradition,” in Theorising the Responsibility to 
Protect, edited by Ramesh Thakur and William Maley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 182, 186-
187. 
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thesis applies international legal disputes over sovereignty, international intervention, and the 
responsibility to protect to the Venezuelan crisis in particular, surveying the differing arguments 
employed by governments, international organizations, and NGOs in support of Guaidó’s claim 
to the Venezuelan presidency or in defense of Maduro’s hold on power.  
The fifth part of the thesis examines the extent to which international legal arguments 
concerning sovereignty align with Las Casas’s views on sovereignty. This section distinguishes 
the historical contexts of Las Casas and the Venezuelan crisis, as well as the differences between 
Las Casas’s views of sovereignty and those of twenty-first century governments. In a similar 
manner, the sixth section of the thesis analyzes how well Las Casas’s political arguments that 
relate to just war theory parallel present-day notions of the responsibility to protect that can be 
applied to the Venezuelan crisis. The seventh component of the thesis elaborates on the key 
takeaways from the fifth and sixth sections and presents the concluding arguments. The seventh 
section of the thesis also outlines potential avenues in which this analysis can contribute to 
further scholarly research, as well as promote more nuanced perspectives on the international 
legal disputes surrounding the Venezuelan crisis.  
The thesis argues that the legal and ethical principles on which governments, 
international organizations, and NGOs have justified their support for Juan Guaidó and their 
opposition to Maduro resemble Las Casas’s arguments concerning international law. However, 
the thesis also argues that the means by which these international actors have supported Guaidó 
in practice do not align with Las Casas’s perspective on international interventions. The thesis 
concludes that Vitoria’s justification of certain international interventions bears greater moral 
and practical applicability to the Venezuelan crisis than Las Casas’s rejection of political and 
military intervention in a state, for intervention can pose a means to address human rights 
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violations that may be perpetuated in an unjust status quo. At the same time, however, Las 
Casas’s argument that international interventions should not lead to greater injustice than they set 
out to alleviate and his skepticism toward unilateral interventions that were not sanctioned by a 
higher international authority render his writings valuable to the analysis of the Venezuelan 
crisis. In this same vein, Sepúlveda’s arguments are less applicable to the Venezuelan crisis in 
particular since it is not clear that unilateral military interventions, which he championed in the 
sixteenth century, would serve as an effective means of alleviating suffering in Venezuela. 
Finally, the thesis argues in favor of a combination of Vitoria’s acceptance of international 
interventions on a limited scope with Las Casas’s admonition to ensure international 
interventions do not inflict more harm than they set out to correct. This combination provides 
preferable moral and practical insights for international efforts to address human rights violations 
in Venezuela. 
I: The Venezuelan Crisis and International Legal Principles 
While the current political and economic crisis in Venezuela has placed the country at the 
center of current political discourse about potential human-rights abuses, political and economic 
instability in Venezuela extends beyond the administrations of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás 
Maduro. Venezuela’s vast oil revenues during the 1970s enabled the country to avoid the 
economic difficulties that plagued many Latin American countries during that decade.8 
Nevertheless, Venezuela’s dependence on oil exports made its economy particularly susceptible 
to the rise and fall of the international price of oil, so when oil prices fell in the early 1980s, 
 
8 Ronald D. Sylvia and Constantine P. Danopoulos, “The Chávez Phenomenon: Political Change in Venezuela,” 
Third World Quarterly 24, no. 1 (2003), accessed February 22, 2020, https://www-jstor-
org.echo.louisville.edu/stable/3993630, 65. 
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Venezuela’s currency also fell in value.9 All the while, the income from oil exports remained 
concentrated in the hands of the Venezuelan upper classes, and political elites in the principal 
parties – AD (Acción Democrática) and COPEI (Comité de Organización Electoral 
Independiente) – used oil revenues to maintain their power through a spoils system.10 Faced with 
declining living standards and increasingly disgruntled with the political elites’ growing 
difficulties in providing rents to the citizenry amid the economic downturn, Venezuelans’ 
discontent exploded into violence during the Caracazo riots of 1989.11 In this context of 
increasing political unrest, the leftist lieutenant colonel Hugo Chávez Frías conspired with 
likeminded military officers to seize power in a coup, viewing with disgust the Venezuelan 
military’s use of force against the Caracazo rioters.12 
After failing to seize political power during a 1992 coup attempt, Chávez served two 
years in prison until then-Venezuelan president Rafael Caldera released him in 1994.13 At that 
point, Chávez’s political allies, particularly Luis Miquilena, convinced him to seek power 
through the electoral process.14 Crafting a political message aimed to appeal to broad swaths of 
the Venezuelan electorate, Chávez won the 1998 presidential election with support from the rural 
and urban working classes as well as middle and upper-class voters.15 Chávez claimed to 
represent the pueblo, or Venezuelan people, against so-called oligarchs whom he portrayed as 
 
9 Ibid.; Jonathan Eastwood, “Introduction: The Revolution in Venezuela?” in The Revolution in Venezuela: Social 
and Political Change under Chávez, eds. Thomas Ponniah and Jonathan Eastwood (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2011), 12. 
10 Eastwood, “Introduction: The Revolution in Venezuela?”, 9, 11-12; Sylvia and Danopoulos, “The Chávez 
Phenomenon,” 64-65. 
11 Eastwood, “Introduction: The Revolution in Venezuela?”, 11-13; Sylvia and Danopoulos, “The Chávez 
Phenomenon,” 65. 
12 Sylvia and Danopoulos, “The Chávez Phenomenon,” 65. 
13 Eastwood, “Introduction: The Revolution in Venezuela?”, 14. 
14 Ibid., 14-16. 
15 Ibid., 3, 16. 
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the chief obstacles to the pueblo’s best interests.16 Given Chávez’s intentions to lead a systematic 
transformation of the political and economic order in Venezuela, he framed his “interventionist 
and redistributive” agenda as the needed means by which the Venezuelan people could overcome 
the “treacherous oligarchy.”17 As Chávez’s administration continued, however, Chávez altered 
his rhetoric and began labeling his political opponents the “bourgeoisie,” using terms from 
Marxist theory and openly calling his government “socialist” beginning in 2005.18 Chávez 
pursued the goal of “participatory democracy” with the aim of politically empowering 
Venezuela’s rural and urban poor, and he sought an economic transition from capitalism to what 
he called twenty-first century socialism.19 
Chávez presumed politicians who opposed his political agenda would threaten his so-
called Bolivarian Revolution, considering dissent harmful to Venezuela’s political, economic, 
and social transformation as he envisioned it.20 Thus, during his administration, the Venezuelan 
government banned opposition candidates from challenging Chávez’s party in elections, 
charging them with corruption but often without substantiating these accusations directly.21 For 
example, the government accused Chávez’s opponent Manuel Rosales of corruption in the 2006 
elections and imprisoned the judge Maria Lourdes Afiuni, who had ordered the release of a 
banker whom the government had charged with corruption.22 Moreover, in 2010 the Chávez 
government arrested the opposition leaders Guillermo Zuloaga and Oswaldo Álvarez Paz, 
 
16 Ibid., 3. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., 3-4. 
19 Ibid., The Revolution in Venezuela, 11, 16; Juan S. Gonzalez, “The Venezuelan Crisis and Salvador Allende’s 
Glasses,” PRISM 8, no.1 (2019): 41-42, accessed February 22, 2020, https://www-jstor-
org.echo.louisville.edu/stable/26597309. 
20 Leonardo Vivas, “Latin America: A Backlash in Human Rights?” Harvard International Review 36, no. 2 (Fall 
2014/Winter 2015): 21, accessed February 22, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43649263. 
21 Eastwood, “Introduction: The Revolution in Venezuela?”, 10. 
22 Ibid., 10. 
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claiming they had committed “speech crimes.”23 Still, at that point the political opposition to 
Chávez did not face systematic government efforts to repress its engagement in politics, and 
Chávez supporters alleged the opposition leaders listed above had broken the law and bore the 
guilt of corruption.24 Nevertheless, the Chávez administration’s increasing attempts to arrest and 
convict its opponents of alleged crimes led Chávez critic Theodoro Petkoff to label the 
administration a “quasi-dictatorship” as early as 2010.25  
Accusations that the Venezuelan government’s defense of liberal democratic values and 
individual rights had markedly eroded would proliferate under Chávez’s successor, Nicolás 
Maduro. During student protests directed against his government in 2014, Maduro deployed the 
police and the military against the protesters.26 The Venezuelan human-rights organizations 
Provea and Foro Penal reported 43 individuals had died; 854 were wounded; 154 had been 
tortured; and 3,293 had faced detentions in connection to the protests as of August 2014.27 The 
Maduro regime’s use of mass arrests and violence to suppress protests motivated Leonardo 
Vivas, the former director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy’s Latin American 
Program, to assert that no contemporary Latin American ruler’s abuses of human rights could 
compare to those of Chávez and Maduro.28 Also, Maduro has continued and expanded Chávez’s 
policy of arresting and jailing political dissidents such as Juan Requesens, who has suffered 
torture and a lack of sufficient medical condition during his imprisonment.29 According to Foro 
Penal, 232 political prisoners were held captive in Venezuela as of November 2018, a number 
 
23 Ibid.. 
24 Ibid., 10-11. 
25 Ibid., 10; “Comptes rendus et essais historiographiques: 2010,” Nuevo Mundo: Mundos Nuevos, 
accessed February 22, 2020, https://journals.openedition.org/nuevomundo/60356. 
26 Vivas, “Latin America: A Backlash in Human Rights?”, 21. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 17, 21. 
29 Luis Almagro, “Defending Democracy and Human Rights in the Western Hemisphere,” PRISM 8, no. 1 (2019): 6, 
accessed February 22, 2020, https://www-jstor-org.echo.louisville.edu/stable/26597306. 
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that grew to 966 just two months later.30 Venezuela’s principal intelligence agency even 
assassinated the dissident Fernando Albán in October 2018.31 
Both Chávez and Maduro sought to restrict the political influence of the Venezuelan 
opposition by limiting freedom of the press.32 Under Chávez, the Venezuelan government 
pursued policies that hampered the ability of the opposition press to promote its message freely. 
The Chávez administration shut down television stations of which it did not approve, used 
intimidation against regional media outlets, prosecuted journalists for alleged offenses, and 
consolidated its cooperation with “friendly media” to promote the government’s policies.33 
Likewise, Maduro’s administration rescinded the political opposition’s freedoms of assembly 
and press, arresting the opposition figure Leopoldo López even though he was participating in a 
peaceful protest.34 In 2015, López was sentenced to fourteen years in prison for allegedly using 
subliminal messages to promote violence.35  
In addition to the political unrest in Venezuela and the crackdowns on Venezuelans’ 
political freedoms, the country faces acute shortages of food and medical supplies amid its 
economic turmoil.36 These shortages have emerged as aftereffects of the government’s policies 
going back to the Chávez years.37 Between 2003 and 2008, Venezuela experienced a period of 
rapid economic growth, in large part because of the high price of oil during those years.38 In the 
wake of the 2008 global recession, however, the Venezuelan economy began to face mounting 
problems that have continued ever since and that stem principally from the corruption and 
 
30 Ibid., 5-6. 
31 Ibid., 6. 
32 Gonzalez, “The Venezuelan Crisis and Salvador Allende’s Glasses,” 42-43. 
33 Ibid., 42. 
34 Ibid., 43. 
35 Ibid. 
36 “Venezuela,” Human Rights Watch, accessed February 22, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/americas/venezuela. 
37 “Venezuela crisis: How the Political Situation Escalated,” BBC. 
38 Eastwood, “Introduction: The Revolution in Venezuela?”, The Revolution in Venezuela, 6. 
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policies of the Chávez and Maduro administrations.39 For example, the Chávez administration 
implemented price controls to increase the affordability of goods like toiletries, flour, and 
cooking oil for the Venezuelan poor.40 Faced with these price controls, Venezuelan businesses 
cut back on their production of the items mentioned above, since their potential profits were 
limited and they intended to ensure they were not producing more than would be profitable given 
the caps on prices.41 Not only did this cutback in production contribute to Venezuelans’ 
shortages of key necessities, but also hyperinflation has made it difficult for Venezuelan 
consumers to procure basic goods.42 By the final months of 2018, hyperinflation had grown so 
severe in Venezuela that prices were doubling every nineteen days, approximately.43  
In this atmosphere of economic and political tension, Maduro’s administration sought to 
counteract the political influence of the National Assembly, the national legislature controlled by 
the political opposition at the time.44 Thus, the administration created the National Constituent 
Assembly in 2017, which included members that supported Maduro’s government, and tasked it 
with devising constitutional changes for Venezuela that Maduro aimed to approve through a 
national referendum.45 By the 2018 presidential elections, opposition legislators in the National 
Assembly alleged the Maduro regime would not ensure free and fair elections.46 With most of 
the opposition parties boycotting the elections, Maduro won a second term, but the National 
 
39 Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Venezuela’s Collapse is the Worst Outside of War in Decades, Economists Say,” New York 
Times, last modified May 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/world/americas/venezuela-economy.html. 
40 “Venezuela crisis: How the Political Situation Escalated,” BBC. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid.  
45 “What Did Venezuelans Vote for and Why Was It So Divisive?” BBC, last modified July 31, 2019, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-40704184; Diego A. Zambrano, “The Constitutional Path to 
Dictatorship in Venezuela,” Stanford Law School, last modified March 20, 2019, 
https://law.stanford.edu/2019/03/20/the-constitutional-path-to-dictatorship-in-venezuela/. 
46 “Venezuela crisis: How the Political Situation Escalated,” BBC. 
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Assembly contended the result was invalid and claimed the presidency stood vacant.47 Thus, the 
president of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, proclaimed himself acting president of 
Venezuela on January 23, 2019.48 Since that date, Guaidó has gained the recognition of more 
than 50 countries, but he has failed to obtain the support of countries such as Russia and China, 
which continue to assert Maduro’s legitimacy.49 Amid the escalating political turmoil, Maduro 
closed Venezuela’s borders with neighboring Colombia and Brazil, aiming to prevent 
international aid from reaching Venezuela.50 Over the following months, this policy has resulted 
in deaths and injuries of Venezuelan citizens at the country’s borders, and hundreds of soldiers in 
Venezuela’s military have abandoned the Maduro regime in favor of the opposition government 
based in Colombia.51 Despite Guaidó’s efforts to win the Venezuelan military to his side, 
however, the bulk of the Venezuelan military has remained loyal to Maduro, preventing Guaidó 
from exercising much actual political authority.52 In May 2019, Maduro’s government and the 
opposition sent representatives to Norway, with the intent of negotiating a solution to the 
political crisis. However, the talks failed to produce any resolution over the ensuing few 
months.53 By early August, the United States had inflicted a new round of sanctions on 
Venezuela, freezing Venezuelan government officials’ financial assets in the United States and 
banning economic dealings between Americans and the Maduro government.54 In the wake of 
these sanctions, Maduro called for his representatives to withdraw from the negotiations with the 
 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Mason Shuya, “Russian Influence in Latin America: A Response to NATO,” Journal of Strategic Security 12, no. 
2 (2019): 25, accessed February 22, 2020, https://www-jstor-org.echo.louisville.edu/stable/26696258. 
51 Ibid. 
52 “Venezuela crisis: How the Political Situation Escalated,” BBC. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
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opposition, pledging not to resume negotiations given the opposition’s support for U.S. 
sanctions.55 
Conflicting notions of sovereignty and the responsibility to protect underlie this ongoing 
international controversy over whether the Maduro regime holds political legitimacy in 
Venezuela. A central principle of international relations, internal sovereignty marks the state as 
the highest legal authority over the inhabitants and resources within the territory it governs.56 
External sovereignty affords a state the authority to engage in international relations as the 
supreme legal representative of the population it governs, on an equal legal standing with other 
states according to international law.57 With the establishment of the United Nations (UN) in 
1945, the dominant international legal perspective on state sovereignty emphasized the role of de 
facto control over territory as a crucial condition for wielding sovereign authority.58 This 
conception of sovereignty treated humanitarian interventions within the territory of a state as 
exceptions to the legal norm, which interpreted a state’s authority within its territory as final and 
inviolate.59 According to this interpretation of state sovereignty, limited international 
interventions within a state’s territory were not construed as a challenge to states’ position as the 
supreme legal authorities within their territory.60 The United Nations Charter illustrates this 
outlook that international interventions should not threaten the jurisdiction accorded to sovereign 
states, noting that the UN did not have authority to “intervene in matters which are essentially 
 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ramesh Thakur, The Responsibility to Protect: Norms, Laws, and the Use of Force in International Politics (New 
York: Routledge, 2011), 78. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Anne Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), 16. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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under the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”61 While the charter calls upon member states to 
take action to preserve “international peace and security” and resolve breaches of the peace, it 
does not explicitly note an intervention should attempt to alter a state’s internal policies.62  
The notion of the responsibility to protect (R2P) proposes state sovereignty does not just 
grant a state legal prerogatives, but also obligations to the inhabitants of the territory it 
administers.63 According to this perspective on sovereignty, when a state is unable or unwilling 
to defend its people and their human rights, the “broader community of states” must assume the 
responsibility to protect these rights in place of the state in question.64 This subjugation of a 
state’s sovereign privileges to the human rights of its citizens and their freedom from oppression, 
can serve as a far-reaching justification for international intervention in states’ internal affairs, 
according to Ramesh Thakur, former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations.65 The 
responsibility to protect, as envisioned by Thakur and the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), calls upon states to use diplomatic, economic, or 
military means to prevent atrocities.66 Thus, the R2P doctrine can serve as a justification for 
military interventions intended ostensibly to stop severe human rights abuses in a particular 
state.67 This notion contrasts strikingly with the UN Charter’s principle of non-intervention in a 
state’s internal affairs.68 
 
61 “UN Charter (full text),” United Nations, accessed February 22, 2020, https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-
charter/un-charter-full-text/, I.2.7. 
62 Ibid., VII.42. 
63 Thakur, The Responsibility to Protect, 78-79. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 79. 
66 Ibid., 138-139; Jonathan Graubart, “War is Not the Answer: The Responsibility to Protect and Military 
Intervention,” in Theorising the Responsibility to Protect, edited by Ramesh Thakur and William Maley 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 202-203. 
67 Thakur, The Responsibility to Protect, 138-139; Graubart, “War is Not the Answer,” 202-203. 
68 “UN Charter (full text),” United Nations, I.2.7. 
Clark 15 
 
By providing potential justifications for military action, R2P draws upon the influence of 
just war theory developed by scholars such as the patristic writer Augustine of Hippo and the 
sixteenth-century Spanish philosopher and theologian Francisco de Vitoria.69 While just war 
theory concerns the study of which ethical conditions need to be met for a war to be initiated and 
waged justly, the concepts of just war theory and the related R2P doctrine also extend themselves 
to analyses of conflicting international views about non-military intervention in Venezuelan’s 
domestic politics.70 According to concepts from just war theory, an intervening party in an armed 
conflict can justify military action if it intends for the war to counteract abuses of human rights 
or dignity, pursues the war as a last resort, instigates the war as a proportional response to 
wrongs suffered, and faces “reasonable prospects” of actually achieving its alleged goals.71 Thus, 
just war theory promotes certain responsibilities of states that would engage in armed conflict 
and intervene in one another’s affairs, responsibilities that lie at the center of much contemporary 
debate about international support for Guaidó and Maduro.  
II: Las Casas, Sovereignty, and Just War  
 The writings of the sixteenth-century Dominican friar and social reformer Bartolomé de 
las Casas provide historical parallels to the twenty-first-century arguments about sovereignty and 
the responsibility to protect that relate to the Venezuelan crisis.72 A Spanish colonist in the 
Caribbean during the early sixteenth century, Las Casas turned against his fellow Spaniards’ 
treatment of Native Americans and dedicated decades of his life to writing and lobbying on 
 
69 Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Just War Tradition,” 182, 186-187; Francisco de Vitoria, “XVI. 
De Indis,” in La conquista del Nuevo Mundo: Textos y documentos de la aventura americana, ed. Mercedes Serna 
(Barcelona: Clásicos Castalia, 2012), 413. 
70 Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Just War Tradition,” 182, 186-187. 
71 Ibid., 182-183. 
72 Diego von Vacano, “Las Casas and the Birth of Race,” History of Political Thought 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2012): 
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behalf of reforms in Spanish policy toward the natives.73 Las Casas sought to influence the Holy 
Roman Emperor Charles V (Charles I of Spain) and his successor, King Philip II of Spain, to 
revise Spanish policy in the New World so as to integrate Native Americans into the general fold 
of Spanish subjects.74 In the 1540s, Las Casas set about writing his work Brevísima relación de 
la destrucción de las Indias (An Account, Much Abbreviated, of the Destruction of the Indies), in 
which he laid out his grievances against the Spanish treatment of Native Americans in a manner 
that drew from the political thought of both Christian and classical writers.75  
In particular, Las Casas decried the “unjust . . . warfare” the Spanish colonists and 
conquistadores had waged against the natives, as well as the “bondage” to which the Spaniards 
had sought to subject the natives who survived the initial onslaught of warfare and European 
diseases.76 Moreover, he condemned the Spaniards’ motives in carrying out these courses of 
action, accusing them of aiming to wrest natives’ riches from their original possessors and of 
advancing their social position for the sake of “insatiable greed and ambition.”77 Through these 
critiques of his fellow Spaniards, Las Casas demonstrated his viewpoint that when individuals 
from one society intervene in another society’s political, religious, or economic affairs, they 
should only do so with just motives and in ways that are consistent with natural law. The notion 
of natural law, derived over the centuries by classical philosophers such as Aristotle and 
Christian writers such as Thomas Aquinas, alleges there are universal norms of just human 
behavior that enable people to pursue a moral, fulfilling, and ideal life.78 Not only did Las Casas 
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accuse the Spanish treatment of Native Americans of having violated natural law, but he also 
wrote it violated divine law – that is, law that he believed God had handed down to govern 
human behavior.79 By alleging the Spaniards had broken laws with universal authority, Las 
Casas implied any international intervention that violated these norms would lose its legitimacy. 
In doing so, he presaged the eventual articulation of a more secular notion of universal human 
rights and states’ responsibilities that would serve to justify the responsibility to protect doctrine 
in the twenty-first century.80  
Las Casas contended unjust Spanish treatment of Native Americans, not colonialism in 
and of itself, rendered the Spanish conquests in the Americas unjustified.81 Demonstrating his 
belief that nonviolent intervention of the Spanish in the natives’ societies was not inherently 
wrong, Las Casas described the lands in the Americas as having been “given in trust by God and 
His Church” to the authority of the Castilian monarchy.82 In keeping with the dominant 
perspective of the clergymen of the Dominican Order, Las Casas supported Spanish settlement in 
the Americas and the conversion of native peoples to Catholicism.83 In doing so, he revealed his 
implicit belief that the Spanish monarchy’s assumption of political authority over conquered 
natives in place of the native potentates who had held power before the conquests did not violate 
natural or international law per se. Rather, Las Casas considered the papal delegation of 
authoritative privileges over much of the Americas to the Castilian crown as the justification for 
the exercise of Spanish authority over indigenous peoples in the Western Hemisphere.84 Las 
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Casas did argue Spanish oppressors of Native Americans had violated “natural, divine, and 
human law” in his Brevísima relación.85 However, his reasoning focused on Spaniards’ abuse of 
their supposedly sovereign authority over native peoples, rather than an indictment of their 
assumption of that authority, for Las Casas considered Spanish sovereignty in the Americas to 
have been handed down from a higher authority – the Papacy.86  
By contrasting his notion of Spanish sovereignty and duties toward indigenous peoples 
with Spaniards’ actual behavior toward Native Americans, Las Casas implied Spanish colonizers 
had neglected their responsibilities toward the natives under Spanish rule.87 Thus, he espoused 
the viewpoint that sovereignty comes with obligations to protect the governed, much like the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) of the twenty-first 
century, which asserts states do not have the right to infringe upon universal human rights of 
their citizens.88 In a similar way, Las Casas reasoned the demands of natural law should take 
precedence over Spaniards’ authority to do as they pleased toward the natives.89 In this way, he 
applied a principle similar to one that the sixteenth-century Spanish philosopher Francisco de 
Vitoria had employed to defend Spaniards’ rights of subjugating the natives to their rule. In his 
work De Indis, which concerns various ethical questions associated with the Spanish conquest of 
the Americas, Vitoria asserted the primacy of natural and divine law over sovereigns’ laws.90 He 
claimed a human law that attempts to prohibit an action that natural and divine law permit is no 
true law at all, supporting his argument by invoking hypothetical laws of Native American 
societies that he contended would violate natural law.91 Despite the differences in Vitoria and 
 
85 Las Casas, “Destruction of the Indies,” 3. 
86 Ibid., 3, 8; Las Casas, “Treinta proposiciones muy jurídicas,” 400-404. 
87 Las Casas, “Destruction of the Indies,” 3, 8; Las Casas, “Treinta proposiciones muy jurídicas,” 400-404. 
88 Thakur, The Responsibility to Protect, 79. 
89 Ibid.; Las Casas, “Destruction of the Indies,” 3, 8. 
90 Vitoria, “XVI. De Indis,” 429. 
91 Ibid. 
Clark 19 
 
Las Casas’s principal arguments, Vitoria’s elevation of universal, legal binding principles over 
political authorities’ freedom of action afforded itself to Las Casas’s critique of Spanish actions 
toward the natives for having violated natural law.  
Invoking the superiority of natural laws over sovereigns’ laws, Las Casas defended the 
sovereignty of Native American rulers as protected by natural law, believing the Spanish did not 
have the right to overthrow native rulers unilaterally if indigenous rulers had not opposed the 
spread of Christianity maliciously.92 In his work Thirty Very Juridical Propositions, Las Casas 
argued natives who practiced idol worship could not be punished by any human judge, implying 
external, secular authorities should not impinge upon Native Americans’ political and social 
autonomy.93 This proposition put Las Casas at odds with his contemporary, the Spanish 
philosopher Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, for the latter considered natives’ idolatry a central 
justification for Spanish military action against them.94 However, Las Casas’s writing on this 
subject reflected a perspective akin to that of Pope Innocent IV.95 During the thirteenth century, 
Innocent IV declared Christian rulers did not have the right to usurp the sovereignty of non-
Christian rulers, subjecting the policies of Christian sovereigns to a higher legal principle.96 Even 
though Las Casas regarded the Pope as exercising spiritual authority over all individuals, 
whether they be Christians or not, his position on this subject did not detract from his belief that 
Christians should not violate natives’ political sovereignty on their own initiative.97 Though Las 
Casas claimed the Spanish government had obtained a right to rule over the Americas through 
 
92 Las Casas, “Treinta proposiciones muy jurídicas,” 400-404. 
93 Ibid., 400-401. 
94 Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, “XIV. De las justas causas de la guerra contra los indios,” in La conquista del Nuevo 
Mundo: Textos y documentos de la aventura americana, ed. Mercedes Serna (Barcelona: Clásicos Castalia, 2012), 
376. 
95 Vitoria, “XVI. De Indis,” 440. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Las Casas, “Treinta proposiciones muy jurídicas,” 397, 400-401. 
Clark 20 
 
the concession of the Pope, he did not provide a justification for Spanish violence against natives 
in the name of such sovereign authority.98 Also, according to Las Casas, an allegedly just war of 
Spaniards against the natives would not be truly just unless the natives meant genuine malice to 
the Spanish or to Christianity.99  
 Las Casas’s views about the Spanish conquests in the Americas set him apart from 
Sepúlveda, whom he debated at Valladolid in 1550 and 1551 at the request of Emperor Charles 
V.100 Sepúlveda contended the Spanish conquests in the Americas were justified and argued the 
use of violence against Native Americans could serve a useful purpose in the expansion of 
Christianity and the suppression of particular native cultures’ practices, such as human 
sacrifice.101 Also, Sepúlveda believed the Native Americans were naturally suited for 
subservience to the Spanish, employing arguments from the political writings of Aristotle to 
support his assertion that certain people were innately fit for servitude.102 Labeling the natives 
inherent servants to the allegedly superior Spaniards, Sepúlveda wrote in favor of war against the 
natives because he maintained it would bring them under the tutelage of a supposedly superior 
political authority.103 In his arguments, Sepúlveda emphasized the averred ends of an 
international intervention over the means used to achieve it, and he considered a war just if it 
produced the ends he considered desirable. According to Sepúlveda, the importance of bringing 
an end to natives’ pre-Christian religious practices and subjugating them to Spanish rule 
rendered the harm the Spaniards inflicted on Native Americans a totally acceptable effect of the 
conquest.104  
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Although Las Casas’s arguments about Spanish colonization did not reject the concept of 
just war, they rebutted Sepúlveda’s attempts to justify the Spanish treatment of indigenous 
peoples in the Americas.105 Las Casas’s arguments affirmed Native Americans and Spaniards 
held equal status before God and shared the same natural rights to receive just treatment from 
others.106 Thus, Las Casas distinguished himself sharply from Sepúlveda, who considered the 
natives naturally inferior to Christian Spaniards and asserted natives’ subjection to Spanish rule, 
believing such an arrangement was allegedly ideal and consistent with divine law.107 Las Casas 
regarded Spanish intervention in Native American societies as legitimate only if it were 
predicated on papal authorization and stemmed from motives of spreading Christianity and 
bringing Native Americans under the fold of the Spanish Crown in a peaceful, “civilizing” 
manner.108 In Las Casas’s view, if the Spanish strayed from these pursuits, they would forfeit the 
justification for their colonization efforts in the Americas.109 Thus, he revealed his alignment 
with the concept from just war theory that demands the use of force against a state be predicated 
on just intentions and executed through just actions.110  
In Las Casas’s view, ambitions of self-aggrandizement at others’ expense and actions 
resulting in cruelty could not justify intervention in Native American societies.111 With this 
perspective, Las Casas made clear that he considered morally condonable means to be just as 
important as morally acceptable goals when executing an international intervention. Las Casas’s 
support for the evangelization of Native Americans despite the Spaniards’ cruel policies toward 
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them attests to his belief that not all components of an international intervention are rendered 
illegitimate because cruelty and violence are present in the intervention.112 However, if an 
intervention in another society gave rise to “wrongs, failings, defects, or evils,” Las Casas argued 
such effects had to be countered with the authority of the Castilian monarch, acting in his 
responsibility to punish his subject’s wrongdoings.113 In this manner, Las Casas asserted his 
understanding that sovereign rulers possess authority over those whom they rule, but also have a 
duty to uphold what is right and to punish offenses against natural law.114 Las Casas’s 
articulation of the Spanish monarch’s responsibility to uphold justice in his realm and of 
Spaniards’ responsibility to adhere to natural law would find parallels in the evolution of 
viewpoints about sovereignty in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
III: The Theoretical Evolution and Application of Sovereignty and Just War Theory 
 Las Casas began his work Thirty Very Juridical Propositions by labeling Spaniards’ 
unjust treatment of Native Americans as contrary to natural principles of justice, considering 
policies toward indigenous peoples void of legitimacy if they conflicted with natural law.115 He 
supplemented this claim by appealing to the Castilian king, writing the monarch had a duty to 
extirpate the wrongs the Spaniards had inflicted on the native peoples of the Americas and 
insisting these wrongs had violated natural law.116 This principle, which promoted a sovereign’s 
duty to uphold a universally-applicable law in the wake of injustices, would come to underlie the 
twenty-first century notion of the responsibility to protect.117 To grasp how Las Casas’s political 
thought relates to the international legal arguments surrounding the present-day Venezuelan 
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crisis, is important to understand how Las Casas understood the notion of sovereign 
responsibility. Moreover, it is crucial to distinguish how Las Casas’s conceptions of sovereignty 
and the responsibilities of sovereigns differ from the twenty-first century perceptions of 
sovereigns’ responsibilities.  
Las Casas was not alone in his articulation of a sovereign ruler’s duty to promote justice 
in the sixteenth century, for Vitoria also wrote about duties to natural law and their application in 
international relations.118 In his work De Indis, Vitoria applied his notion of the supremacy of 
natural laws to argue Spanish intervention in Native American societies would not only be 
permissible, but also necessary, if pursued with the aim of halting and avenging wrongs against 
natural law that the Spaniards or the natives had suffered.119 In particular, he asserted the Spanish 
had both the right and the duty to protect innocents threatened with offenses against natural law, 
such as human sacrifice and cannibalism.120 Vitoria supported his arguments in De Indis with 
quotations from the biblical book of Proverbs; the writings of spiritual authorities from Christian 
history, such as Pope Innocent III; and the biblical command to care for one’s neighbors.121 
Despite the religious basis on which Vitoria developed his arguments, his conclusions serve as 
predecessors of twenty-first-century theory about the limits of state sovereignty and the 
responsibility to protect. Vitoria’s declaration that the Pope could depose Native American rulers 
if those rulers oppressed native converts to Christianity serves as an excellent case in point.122 
His reasoning, drawing upon the principle that natural and divine laws trump those of 
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governments, argues that sovereign states have a binding responsibility to defend their citizens’ 
universal human rights.123  
 Las Casas applied this perspective on sovereigns’ responsibilities to his writings on the 
role of the Castilian monarchy in the government of territories in the Americas. In Thirty Very 
Juridical Propositions, he wrote the Castilian monarch had an obligation from divine right to 
promote just laws and customs in the Americas.124 Las Casas did not claim that a higher political 
authority should assume sovereignty in place of the Castilian king if the monarch did not 
exercise his duties to uphold justice in his realm. Nevertheless, his elaboration of the 
responsibilities of the Castilian sovereign and not just those of his Spanish subjects toward 
Native Americans attests to Las Casas’s view that a government’s authority is limited, just as the 
R2P doctrine asserts state sovereignty is limited. Las Casas’s expressed this perception of 
sovereignty further through his assertion of the Pope’s supreme spiritual authority over 
Christians and non-Christians, for he implied the Pope could rightfully exercise his authority to 
punish a Christian monarch who failed to uphold just laws.125 
 Las Casas’s notions of sovereigns’ responsibilities would find parallels in the twentieth 
century as a more modern articulation of sovereign responsibility began to emerge in the post-
World War II international order. Just as Las Casas considered the Pope to hold an overarching 
authority to promote moral order within Christian kingdoms and hold Christian sovereigns 
accountable for injustices, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld asserted the UN’s 
administrative apparatus had the authority to maintain peace and security in the international 
community.126 Hammarskjöld considered the UN uniquely positioned to protect newly 
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decolonized states from assaults on their sovereignty and to prevent the outbreak of postcolonial 
violence during the 1950s and 1960s, seeing as the UN had a duty to act independently of any 
state.127 Hammarskjöld’s impact on the development of the UN’s role as a “policing and 
managerial” actor advanced the notion that the UN, as well as other international actors, could 
intervene in a state to promote humanitarian goals without becoming a partial participant in the 
state’s domestic conflicts.128 The notion that Hammarskjöld championed did not advance the 
idea that a state had such a right to intervene in another state’s internal affairs. This conception of 
the UN’s promotion of international security and conflict resolution served to justify expansions 
of UN peacekeeping operations in the last decades of the twentieth century.129 However, UN 
forces’ failures to prevent the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the massacre of civilians at 
Srebrenica during the Balkan wars of the 1990s prompted increasing international criticism of 
the UN’s role in addressing international crises and humanitarian disasters.130 Much of this 
criticism, which came specially from Western media and activists, questioned the UN’s efforts to 
stay neutral in crises and critiqued the notion that UN peacekeepers should only use force 
defensively amid periods of intense violence against civilians.131  
 Despite increasing international dissatisfaction with the UN’s flawed peacekeeping 
operations during the 1990s, the widespread international acceptance of UN peacekeeping in 
principle maintained the consensus that the UN, not just sovereign states, had the authority to 
intervene in states’ internal conflicts to promote peace and security.132 The implication of this 
viewpoint did not assert that the UN held authority to assume the political powers of a sovereign 
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state without that state’s permission during peacekeeping operations. It did, however, confirm 
other international actors besides states could legitimately involve themselves militarily and 
politically in the attempted resolution of a state’s internal crises.133 Thus, UN peacekeeping 
operations expressed the conviction that crises threatening individuals’ human rights were global 
issues of importance to all states, not just domestic issues of any one state.134 By supporting a 
UN prerogative to prosecute humanitarian attempts to restore stability to states wracked with 
conflict, Hammarskjöld indicated that the UN had a responsibility to act on behalf of 
humanitarian goals with universal importance.135 Francis Deng, the UN Secretary-General’s 
Representative on Internally Displaced Persons during the 1990s, articulated the notion of 
international responsibility to resolve armed conflicts further.136 He formulated the concept of 
“‘sovereignty as responsibility’” that argued states – not just the UN – had a responsibility to 
limit their use of power to protect civilians.137 The 2002 formation of the African Union (AU) 
from the Organization of African Unity further developed this concept that sovereignty entails 
limits on a state’s prerogatives, which must adhere to overarching standards against human-
rights abuses.138 The AU’s Constitutive Act afforded it the authority to intervene in a member 
state’s affairs if the assembly of member states agreed intervention would be necessary to stop 
“‘war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.’”139  
The concept of the responsibility to protect drew from earlier ideas of limits on 
sovereignty and international duty to protect human rights, but this so-called doctrine of 
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contested international norms did not assume its current form and name until the turn of the 
twenty-first century.140 In 2000, the Canadian government promoted the establishment of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).141 This commission’s 
initial duty concerned an investigation of whether or not the 1999 military intervention of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into the conflict in Kosovo had been in accordance 
with international law.142 The ICISS contributed critically to the debate about international 
intervention in armed conflicts by shifting the focus from an international “‘right to intervene’” 
to every state’s “‘responsibility to protect’” its population from crimes against humanity.143 The 
commission worded these concepts in this way to undercut the notion that states could 
legitimately intervene in another state’s affairs for ostensibly humanitarian reasons while in fact 
seeking to impose their political will on another state.144 Thus, the ICISS related the emerging 
R2P doctrine to just war theory’s call for military interventions to be predicated on the 
intervening party’s right intentions for taking up arms.145 However, the extreme difficulty of 
ascertaining whether a state’s intervention is based on right intentions lends itself to the 
skepticism that governments, including the Venezuelan government, have shown toward R2P.146 
The 2005 UN General Assembly resolution on R2P established the responsibility to 
protect as a formal principle in international affairs, although the principle has yet to gain 
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universal acceptance from the international community.147 In a decision whose principle pertains 
particularly to the Venezuelan crisis, the General Assembly endorsed international efforts to use 
a variety of preventive measures to forestall an outbreak of abuses of human rights that might 
call for an international military response.148 This position relies upon the idea that the 
international community would be justified in using peaceful means to pressure a government 
into changing its policies in order to avert a humanitarian crisis.149 The non-military component 
of the R2P doctrine’s characterization of international interventions provides theoretical support 
for the diplomatic recognitions of Guaidó on the part of governments who oppose the Maduro 
regime and consider Maduro’s policies threatening to Venezuelans’ human rights.150 Also, the 
R2P’s emphasis on non-military options for international intervention parallels Las Casas’s 
support for non-military Spanish intervention in Native American societies to spread 
Catholicism.151 Nevertheless, non-military interventions in a crisis often do not serve as realistic 
means to counteract human rights abuses, just as U.S. sanctions against the Maduro regime and 
countries’ diplomatic recognitions of Guaidó have not prompted an end to the Maduro 
government’s human rights abuses. Thus, the R2P doctrine’s justifications for military 
intervention remain crucial to distinguishing R2P from earlier notions of the proper 
circumstances for intervention as described in the UN Charter.152 The diplomatic recognitions 
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that governments have extended to Guaidó do not necessarily constitute support for the R2P 
doctrine, for diplomatic recognition serves as a legitimate means to confer acceptance of a 
government’s sovereignty, without respect to R2P.153  
The R2P’s relation to the concept of right intention aligns it with Las Casas’s 
condemnations of Spaniards’ intentions in their treatment of Native Americas during the early 
sixteenth century. Despite Las Casas’s ardent support for the Christianization of the natives, he 
did not justify his fellow Spaniards’ behavior toward the natives simply on the basis that they 
claimed to be spreading Christianity.154 Rather, Las Casas alleged the Spaniards’ failures to 
adhere to natural law in their treatment of the natives delegitimized the means by which they had 
propagated their conquests in the Americas, condemning Spaniards’ use of Native Americans as 
forced laborers in particular.155  
Also, Las Casas’s writings exemplified the perspective that sovereignty comes with 
responsibility, the axiom that underlies the principle of the responsibility to protect.156 He 
implored the Emperor Charles V to avenge the wrongs the Spaniards had inflicted on the Native 
Americas, writing, “It is the duty of the king, with greatest study and vigilant industry, to root . . . 
out” such injustices.157 Las Casas did not claim a foreign power could legitimately seek to 
undermine the Spanish king’s authority or overthrow him militarily if he did not live up to the 
“duty” Las Casas described. However, Las Casas insisted the king had an obligation to not 
tolerate the depopulation of indigenous peoples in the Americas and the Spaniards’ cruelty 
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toward them.158 In his Brevísima relación, Las Casas implied such offenses against natural law 
were so severe that a higher authority had to punish them if the Spanish colonists in the 
Americas would not do so.159 Las Casas’s articulation of a sovereign’s responsibility to uphold 
justice with that sovereign’s territory provides a historical precedent for its application in the 
R2P doctrine. Additionally, Las Casas’s assertion of papal spiritual authority over all people 
serves as a precedent for the responsibility to protect doctrine’s underlying assumption that an 
international authority higher than any one state, such as the UN or a coalition of states, can 
wield legitimate authority to defend international peace and security.160 Therefore, despite the 
differences in the historical contexts and the tenets of Las Casas’s arguments and the R2P 
doctrine, the latter exemplifies Las Casas’s attitudes about the inviolate responsibilities of 
sovereigns. The principle of the responsibility to protect also serves as an evolved expression of 
Las Casas’s support for nonviolent interventions that promoted ends he viewed as just.161 
At the same time, however, Las Casas’s opposition to international interventions that did 
not enjoy the backing of the papacy and that inflicted harm on individuals sets his views apart 
from R2P.162 Whereas R2P provides a justification for states to act in coalitions or even 
unilaterally to use nonviolent or military means to intervene in a state and address violations of 
human rights, Las Casas did not provide for such a possibility of unilateral political or military 
intervention in his arguments.163 Rather, Sepúlveda’s arguments in favor of Spanish military 
intervention against Native Americans, which he portrayed as an important means to counteract 
polytheistic religious practices in the Americas, serves as a closer precedent for the R2P 
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doctrine.164 Unlike Las Casas, Sepúlveda did not qualify his arguments in favor of military 
intervention on a need for approval from a higher international authority.165  
Also, Sepúlveda considered military intervention to be a necessary means to put a stop to 
particular Native American practices that contradicted natural law, whereas Las Casas argued 
unilateral political or military intervention in Native American societies was unjustified even 
when such societies engaged in practices that violated natural law.166 Therefore, Sepúlveda’s 
views parallel the R2P’s justifications for international interventions better than Las Casas’s 
views do. However, Sepúlveda’s portrayal of the Native Americans in a racist way that 
emphasized their alleged inferiority to the Spaniards impedes his views’ appeal to twenty-first-
century readers. Furthermore, his broad justification of military interventions puts his views at 
odds with a key principle of the UN Charter that states should not intervene without permission 
in another state’s internal affairs, a principle that R2P also violates.167 Also, Sepúlveda’s writings 
do not necessarily apply well to the Venezuelan crisis in particular because it is not clear how a 
potential military intervention in Venezuela would be carried out and whether or not it would 
stand a realistic chance of producing a lasting improvement in Venezuelans’ well-being. 
Certainly, the status quo in Venezuela is unacceptable in that Venezuelan citizens have been 
dying and suffering human rights violations at the hands of the Maduro regime.168 Still, a 
military intervention should be pursued if that option is considered the last and best resort for 
counteracting human rights abuses that would enjoy a likely chance of achieving that aim.169 
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Vitoria’s writings took a middle ground between Las Casas and Sepúlveda’s arguments 
regarding military intervention. While Vitoria did not establish as wide-ranging of a justification 
for military intervention in his arguments as did Sepúlveda, he did consider military intervention 
justified if a state violated international legal principles of “the law of nations,” such as freedom 
of trade, so long as interventions aimed to promote “peace and security.”170 Crucially, Vitoria’s 
arguments’ limits on the applicability of international interventions establish his views as in 
alignment with the pre-R2P notions of international intervention as needing to be predicated on 
gaining the permission of a state before intervening in its territory.171 Vitoria did not center his 
arguments around justifications of interventions to correct abuses of natural law by a government 
against its own citizens. Still, his arguments on the justification of interventions bear greater 
moral and practical weight with respect to Venezuela than do those of Las Casas, for the 
international community should not stand by and allow the unjust Venezuelan status quo to 
persist. Vitoria’s acceptance of certain international interventions that are intended to alleviate 
sufferings endured, while not describing the same context as that of the Venezuelan crisis, lends 
itself to potential political or military interventions that could be applied in Venezuela. Las Casas 
rejected international interventions that were launched without papal authority and that inflicted 
harm on Native Americans.172 Thus, his restrictive views on international interventions’ 
justifiability are less applicable than those of Vitoria to governments’ and international 
organizations’ efforts to pressure the Maduro regime to refrain from further human rights abuses. 
However, Las Casas’s interest in preventing international interventions from resulting in 
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injustices and oppression toward individuals does lend itself to analysis of the Venezuelan crisis, 
for any international intervention in Venezuela, whether it be political, economic, or even 
military, should seek to minimize harm to Venezuelan citizens.173 This principle of 
proportionality, which calls for international interventions to use necessary means to counteract 
injustices without inflicting more harm than they aim to resolve, underlies the political thought 
of Las Casas, and it also serves as a key principle in Vitoria’s political thought.174 Thus, the 
arguments regarding the Venezuelan crisis that align with Vitoria’s views about the justifiability 
of certain international interventions to address injustices and that align with Las Casas’s views 
about proportionality provide morally and practically favorable courses of action for the 
international community with respect to the Venezuelan crisis. 
IV: The Venezuelan Crisis and Conflicting Views of Sovereignty and its Limits 
 Juan Guaidó’s 2019 bid for international recognition as Venezuelan president and the 
varying international responses to his claim to such authority has illuminated conflicting notions 
of sovereignty in the Venezuelan crisis, reflecting positive and skeptical views of the 
responsibility to protect. On the one hand, governments that have recognized Guaidó have based 
their decisions to do so on the notion that the Maduro regime has forfeited its claim to 
sovereignty because of its failures to uphold “free and fair elections” and protect human rights.175 
States that have recognized Guaidó include the United States as well as several European and 
Latin American countries, leaving Cuba and Bolivia as the only Latin American states openly 
backing Maduro.176 When the United States Department of State recognized Guaidó as 
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Venezuela’s interim president in late January 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo framed 
this recognition as congruent with Venezuela’s constitution and the will of the country’s 
National Assembly.177 He referred to the National Assembly as “legitimately elected” in contrast 
to Maduro, and he demanded Maduro “step aside in favor of a legitimate leader” who would 
hold the genuine support of the Venezuelan electorate.178 Branding Maduro’s administration a 
“disastrous dictatorship,” Pompeo depicted the U.S. recognition of Guaidó as consistent with 
Venezuelans’ struggle for the rule of law and political freedoms, as well as the pursuit of “free 
and fair elections.”179 Pompeo’s arguments reflect his portrayal of the U.S. recognition of Guaidó 
– a diplomatic intervention in the Venezuelan political crisis – as a defense of Venezuelan 
sovereignty, not a violation of it. After all, long-standing principles of international relations 
have viewed diplomatic recognition as a wholly legitimate act that serves as one of the primary 
tests of a government’s sovereignty.180 By declaring Venezuelan sovereignty to rest in the hands 
of Guaidó, the National Assembly, and the people who elected Venezuela’s legislators, Pompeo 
represented the U.S. recognition of Guaidó as a completely justified act.181 Moreover, his 
references to the pursuit of democracy, political liberties, and free elections in Venezuela 
demonstrated the U.S. argument that Venezuela’s government has a responsibility to protect 
democracy and the rights of its citizens.182  
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Thus, the U.S. recognition of Guaidó reveals the U.S. government considers its support 
for Guaidó to align with international law and universal principles, noting Maduro’s failure to 
uphold his government’s responsibilities toward the people of Venezuela.183 This rationale 
corresponds to the 2005 World Summit Outcome on R2P’s interpretation of state sovereignty, 
which claims governments must uphold absolute responsibilities to protect their citizens’ rights 
and contends governments revoke their sovereignty when they fail to fulfill such duties.184 
According to this understanding of sovereignty, when a government does not adhere to its 
responsibilities to defend the human rights of its people, other states have the right to use 
diplomatic and economic means to pressure that government to change its policies.185 While 
Pompeo did not reference the term responsibility to protect explicitly when defending the U.S. 
recognition of Guaidó, his arguments for that recognition are replete with the approach to 
sovereignty and international intervention embodied in the R2P doctrine.186 Pompeo’s statement 
assumes a priori that sovereignty demands responsibility and does not just convey privileges to a 
government.187 Moreover, his insistence that “free and fair elections” occur in Venezuela implies 
securing such elections is so vital to Venezuela that some authority must take action to promote 
them, even if that authority is another state or a coalition of states that seek to influence 
Venezuelan politics.188 According to this line of thought, the United States would have the right 
to use diplomatic recognition as a political tool to promote the authority of one faction in another 
state’s political crisis while attempting to undermine the authority of the other faction. 
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The leaders of European countries such as France, Germany, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom have recognized Guaidó as the legitimate president of Venezuela as well, sharing 
Guaidó’s view that Maduro rigged the 2018 presidential elections and subsequently refused to 
hold snap elections.189 Like Pompeo, these leaders justified their decision to recognize Guaidó by 
invoking limits on the Maduro regime’s sovereignty.190 For instance, Spanish Prime Minister 
Pedro Sánchez coupled his recognition of Guaidó with a call for Venezuela to implement 
“elections that are free, democratic, with guarantees and without exclusions.”191 The United 
Kingdom’s former Foreign Secretary, Jeremy Hunt, echoed Sánchez’s sentiment when he 
remarked, “The Maduro regime must end. It is time for free and fair elections.”192 Therefore, 
Sánchez and Hunt have based their claims of Maduro’s illegitimacy on his regime’s failure to 
preserve elections that are free and fair, implying a government forfeits its sovereignty when it 
does not carry out such elections. Their remarks assert a government’s sovereignty comes with 
responsibilities to preserve the rights of the inhabitants of that state to engage in politics 
democratically, a viewpoint consistent with the R2P doctrine’s insistence that governments must 
uphold their citizens’ human rights. At the same time, however, the European governments that 
have recognized Guaidó as Venezuela’s president have not invoked the R2P doctrine directly to 
justify their decision, just as Pompeo did not mention R2P in his remarks. Instead of claiming 
their states or their international community is assuming responsibilities that the Maduro regime 
has forfeited, the spokesmen for the European governments that have recognized Guaidó 
asserted the Venezuelan people continue to hold true sovereignty within their country.193 Thus, 
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these governments portray their diplomatic intervention in the Venezuelan political crisis as a 
means to restore rightful sovereignty to the Venezuelan people, rather than as a means to usurp 
sovereignty from Maduro’s government. 
 Luis Almagro, the tenth Secretary General of the Organization of American States 
(OAS), further exemplifies the viewpoint of the U.S., Canadian, and European governments that 
sovereign states have a responsibility to defend democratic institutions within their 
jurisdiction.194 Calling democracy “a right for the peoples of the Americas,” Almagro has argued 
“all sectors of society, domestic and international,” should contribute continuously to the 
protection of “democracy, freedom, and human rights.”195 His reference to collaboration between 
domestic and international organizations on behalf of democracy and human rights illustrates the 
perspective that those institutions and principles are outside the authority of any one state to 
repress. Almagro thus demonstrated he considers it both acceptable and necessary for states to 
apply pressure on governments that are violating human rights, with the aim of influencing them 
to uphold their responsibilities to defend those rights. In this way, Almagro advanced the 
position on sovereignty that Pompeo, Sánchez, and Hunt used to justify their countries’ 
recognitions of Guaidó, demonstrating alignment with the R2P doctrine. 
 UN Secretary-General António Guterres, while not expressing support for either Maduro 
or Guaidó, urged “all relevant actors” in the Venezuelan crisis to participate in dialogue to 
resolve the turmoil and respect “the rule of law and human rights.”196 In a statement his 
spokesperson issued on January 24, 2019, Guterres expressed his support for a “transparent and 
independent investigation” of reports that there had been casualties in the aftermath of political 
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protests in Venezuela.197 These statements indicate Guterres regards casualties inflicted on 
protesting civilians and the protection of human rights in Venezuela as international concerns, 
not matters subject solely to the jurisdiction of the Venezuelan government. Guterres did not call 
for an international intervention in Venezuelan political affairs through diplomatic, economic, or 
military means. However, he did display his standpoint that external actors have the right to 
investigate potential abuses of human rights and that the Maduro regime should uphold the 
human rights of its citizens, as well as “prevent violence and avoid any escalation” of the 
crisis.198 Thus, Guterres has implied the same belief in the limited privileges of sovereignty that 
underlies the above-mentioned statements of Pompeo, Sánchez, Hunt, and Almagro. When he 
called for all actors in the Venezuelan crisis to preserve human rights and promote the rule of 
law, Guterres depicted sovereignty as a status that comes with the responsibility to protect 
Venezuelans’ rights.199  
 Various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have made implicit appeals to the 
concepts of the R2P doctrine to critique the Maduro regime’s policies. For instance, Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) has framed the shortages of food and medicine in Venezuela under 
Maduro as an “unprecedented humanitarian emergency.”200 José Miguel Vivanco, Executive 
Director of HRW’s Americas Division, has called Maduro’s government and security forces 
guilty of “serious violations” of human rights.201 He has singled out the Maduro regime for 
“violations to the rights of food and health” as well as for politically motivated arrests, tortures, 
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and executions of the regime’s political opposition.202 To address these abuses of human rights, 
Vivanco has urged the Human Rights Council (HRC) to support the formation of an 
“independent fact-finding mission” that would launch its own investigations into those guilty of 
“egregious crimes” taking place in Venezuela.203  
Vivanco’s proposal demonstrates the HRW’s leadership’s conviction that governments 
must not use their sovereignty as an excuse to abuse the human rights of their citizens. Moreover, 
Vivanco’s call for the creation of a fact-finding mission to investigate the Venezuelan 
government’s extrajudicial arrests, tortures, and executions reveals his belief that the 
international community should hold Maduro’s government accountable for its human rights 
violations.204 This perspective lends itself to the argument that bringing violators of human rights 
to justice is so important that an international fact-finding mission has a right to investigate a 
government’s dispensation of domestic punishments. The Venezuelan government has claimed it 
would allow the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
to investigate its policies in light of international pressure from other states, and Vivanco has 
insisted that “this is not the time to relax that pressure.”205 Thus, Vivanco has invoked the 
principle from the 2005 World Summit Outcome on R2P that outlines the international 
community’s responsibility to employ “peaceful means” to protect human rights in a state whose 
government violates them.206 
 Amnesty International shares this attitude toward the Venezuelan crisis, considering 
Maduro and his security forces complicit in “crimes against international law and human rights 
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violations” and calling for top Venezuelan government officials to answer for such crimes before 
“an independent and impartial judicial body.”207 This recommendation serves as another 
manifestation of the idea that the international community should intervene in a state that does 
not comply with its obligation to protect its citizens from human rights abuses.208 Another NGO, 
the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, has framed the Venezuelan crisis as one that 
“leaves populations at risk of potential crimes against humanity.”209 In its assessment of the 
Venezuelan crisis, this organization notes the Venezuelan government has not upheld the 
political rights of all Venezuelans “regardless of political affiliation.”210 That said, the 
organization does not approve of all international efforts to influence the Venezuelan 
government to adhere to its responsibility to protect. For instance, the Global Centre has called 
the United States’ increased implementation of economic sanctions against the Maduro regime 
an unwise course of policy, predicting such sanctions will make it more difficult for Venezuelans 
to procure medicine, food, and other necessary goods.211 
In contrast to these NGOs, the Venezuelan government has invoked a more traditional 
perspective on sovereignty that rejects the current notion of the responsibility to protect. At the 
2005 session of the World Summit General Assembly, Chávez presented his government’s 
grievances against R2P, urging other governments to prohibit “a handful of countries” to 
reinterpret international legal principles according to the R2P doctrine.212 He even linked R2P 
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with “preemptive war,” implying other countries threatened Venezuela with preemptive war 
through the potential use of R2P to justify armed intervention in Venezuela.213 According to 
Chávez’s perspective, R2P offers states a convenient and unjustified excuse to interfere in 
sovereign states’ internal affairs, implying the negative effects of interventions predicated on 
R2P would overshadow the allegedly admirable justifications for those interventions.214 
Venezuela’s delegation to the UN continued to use such an argument at the 2009 UN General 
Assembly, when it spoke in opposition to the conclusions of the 2005 World Summit Declaration 
on R2P.215 In 2012, the Venezuelan delegation to the UN again argued against the responsibility 
to protect, making Venezuela one of only two states to denounce R2P openly during the informal 
dialogue.216 
Li Junhua, the counselor for China’s UN mission as of June 2007, made a similar 
argument before the UN Security Council, claiming intervention in a sovereign state’s internal 
affairs should be pursued only if “the will of the government concerned be respected” and if “no 
arbitrary intervention” be carried out “over its objection.”217 During the interactive dialogue at 
the 2017 UN General Assembly, the Russian delegation also critiqued R2P.218 The delegation 
questioned the efficacy of R2P as a viable tool to address abuses of human rights, claiming 
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R2P’s implementation had “resulted in complete failure” in “recent country specific cases,” 
apparently referring to the UN-backed 2011 outside intervention in Libya’s civil war.219 Just as 
the prudential constraint from just war theory contends a war should not be waged if its 
perpetrators do not enjoy a reasonable chance of success, the Russian government contends R2P 
should not be implemented because it is unlikely to achieve its stated ends.220 Additionally, the 
Russian speaker criticized the most recent UN report on R2P at the time for its use of “vague 
terms” like “atrocity crimes” and its alleged failure to note exactly what R2P meant or how it 
would be implemented.221 Chávez, too, portrayed R2P as ominously vague, noting, “We have to 
ask ourselves who is going to protect us, how are they going to protect us.”222 Chávez’s concerns 
with who would carry out interventions predicated on R2P relates closely to concerns that the 
R2P doctrine could serve as a convenient excuse for a state’s self-aggrandizement.223 Given the 
skepticism of the Venezuelan, Chinese, and Russian governments toward R2P, predictably these 
countries have rejected the arguments concerning human rights in Venezuela that the 
governments that recognize Guaidó have invoked. 
The Venezuelan, Chinese, and Russian positions on state sovereignty in the wake of the 
development of the R2P doctrine demonstrate that these governments claim to view sovereignty 
as inviolate on a global scale, meaning there is no higher authority than the sovereign state in 
international law. Liu Zhenmin, China’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN as of 
December 2006, asserted that state sovereignty must not be infringed, implying the absolute 
protection of governments’ authority within their jurisdictions is a legal principle of international 
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relations that applies to all nations.224 Liu’s statement implied that states have no lawful right to 
intervene in each other’s sovereign affairs ever, in accordance with the early principle of non-
intervention in the UN Charter.225 The Chinese government’s position on international 
interventions bears a parallel to Las Casas’s writings, for Las Casas believed Christian 
sovereigns could not lawfully wrest political authority from Native American rulers except in 
cases of genuine malice against Christians or in the case of having received political authority 
from the Pope.226 In other words, Las Casas did not favor a unilateral Spanish political or 
military intervention in Native American societies, especially not one predicated on devious 
motives inconsistent with natural law.227  
V. Las Casas and Sovereignty in the Current Venezuelan Crisis 
 The United States has supported its recognition of Guaidó and its opposition to the 
Maduro regime by asserting ultimate sovereignty in Venezuela rests with the Venezuelan people, 
not with Maduro’s government.228 This notion of sovereignty is found in U.S. President Donald 
Trump’s remarks about the Venezuelan crisis in Miami, Florida in February 2019.229 During his 
speech, Trump alleged that the Maduro regime has not respected the “sovereign rights of its 
citizens.”230 To support his assertion that Maduro’s government lacks genuine sovereignty, 
Trump referenced Article 350 of the Venezuelan constitution, which vows that the Venezuelan 
people will not submit to a regime that dispenses with democratic principles and fails to uphold 
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human rights.231 Furthermore, Trump accused the Maduro government of interfering with the 
fairness of elections, unjustly prosecuting political enemies, and undermining the rule of law.232 
Although Trump did not state directly that a government’s failure to maintain fair elections and 
the rule of law would result in its loss of sovereignty, his remarks imply his administration’s 
claim that a government holds sovereignty only as long as it fulfills these conditions. That said, 
Trump’s remarks and those of his administration in general, as well as other governments that 
have endorsed Guaidó do not constitute an endorsement of the R2P doctrine with respect to 
Venezuela.  
 The Lima Group, a coalition of the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Saint Lucia, 
has also labeled Maduro’s re-election illegitimate.233 In the Lima Group’s declaration of support 
for the Venezuelan National Assembly after Venezuela’s 2018 presidential election, its member 
governments implored Maduro not to take office as Venezuelan president.234 The declaration 
cited a breakdown in the democratic institutions of Venezuela, the rule of law, and governmental 
respect for Venezuelans’ human rights as reasons for its support of the National Assembly as 
opposed to Maduro’s administration.235 The Lima Group thus expressed the notion that 
sovereignty demands adherence to inviolate responsibilities, the viewpoint implied in Trump’s 
February 2019 speech about Venezuela. Unlike Trump, however, the Lima Group rejected the 
prospect of international military action against the Maduro regime when it declared its support 
for the National Assembly. Asserting the resolution of the Venezuelan crisis must arise from the 
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actions of the Venezuelan people, the Lima Group condemned the use of military action against 
Venezuela and throughout its surrounding region.236  
With its opposition to the use of military force in Venezuela, the Lima Group’s stance 
toward the crisis bears greater resemblance to Las Casas’s understanding of sovereignty and its 
limits than does Trump’s more open-ended statements about resolving the crisis. Las Casas 
recognized the sovereignty of Native American rulers, referring to them as legitimate authorities 
within their societies, and he condemned any opposition to this perspective as heretical.237 He 
did, however, support Spanish intervention in Native American societies to spread Christianity, 
so long as that intervention remained focused on evangelization and was carried out 
peacefully.238 Las Casas did not consider his support for evangelization in the Americas to 
constitute a threat to native rulers’ sovereignty, as he did not call for the Spaniards to interfere 
with the political institutions of the Native Americans. Therefore, the Lima Group’s outlook on 
the Venezuelan crisis resembles Las Casas’s viewpoints concerning Spanish colonization 
because the Lima Group disavowed the use of violence to resolve the Venezuelan crisis. Also, 
the Lima Group did not frame its declaration on Venezuela as representing political interference 
in Venezuelan affairs, just as Las Casas did not challenge the legitimacy of native rulers’ 
political authority within their jurisdictions.239  
By leaving open the option of U.S. military action against the Maduro regime, Trump 
differentiated his arguments from Las Casas’s understanding of sovereignty, for Las Casas 
explicitly opposed Spaniards’ use of violence against Native American sovereigns and 
 
236 Ibid. 
237 Las Casas, “Treinta proposiciones muy jurídicas,” 399-400. 
238 Sepúlveda, “XIV. De las justas causas de la guerra contra los indios,” 365. 
239 Las Casas, “Treinta proposiciones muy jurídicas,” 399-401. 
Clark 46 
 
populations.240 Trump’s February 2019 comments on the Venezuelan crisis do share Las Casas’s 
perspective that one country should not exercise political authority over another, a viewpoint 
implied in Trump’s reference to the “sovereign rights” of Venezuela’s citizens.241 However, the 
assertion that the Venezuelan people, not their rulers, hold supreme sovereignty in Venezuela 
does not correspond to Las Casas’s writings on sovereignty, for the latter describes sovereignty 
as belonging to the rulers of a people.242 Las Casas did not argue citizens or governmental 
institutions should oust a sovereign ruler from power, in contrast to the United States’ support for 
Guaidó’s attempted seizure of power from Maduro at the end of April 2019.243 Furthermore, Las 
Casas alleged the Spanish monarchy had gained political authority over native peoples in the 
Americas because the Pope had conferred that sovereignty on the Spanish ruler, and he did not 
contend the Spanish had a right to overthrow Native American rulers on their own initiative.244 
 Las Casas’s belief that citizens and governments to have no right to usurp sovereignty 
from rulers unilaterally aligns his views in part with the Russian and Chinese claims about 
sovereignty in the Venezuelan crisis.245 The Russian government’s support for Maduro in the 
wake of American, European, and Latin American recognitions of Guaidó as acting Venezuelan 
President allows Russia to portray itself as a reliable defender of governments sympathetic to its 
foreign-policy goals.246 In this way, Russia acts as a counterweight to the United States, 
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positioning itself as a country that will support governments whose sovereignty appears under 
threat, just as the United States has portrayed itself as a defender of Georgian and Ukrainian 
sovereignty.247 Russia’s primary assistance to the Maduro regime has come through Russia’s role 
as a lender of last resort for the Venezuelan government.248 Since 2006, the Russian government 
and the oil company Rosneft have supplied the Venezuelan government with, at minimum, $17 
billion worth of credit lines as well as loans to help the government’s finances remain solvent.249 
The Chinese government has followed a similar policy of financing the Venezuelan government 
with loans, though China has begun to scale back its economic aid to the Maduro regime as 
Chinese economic growth has slowed.250 The debt Venezuela incurs to Russia makes it 
financially lucrative for Russia to remain invested in the Maduro regime’s survival, and despite 
its debt to Russia, officials in the Maduro government have welcomed the Russian engagement 
in Venezuela.251 Venezuela’s Vice President, Tareck El Aissami, expressed his government’s 
gratefulness to Russia for fostering the “best moment” for Russian-Venezuelan relations and for 
“efficient political and diplomatic coordination . . . against the imperial siege and aggression 
which Russia also suffers.”252 Thus, El Aissami depicted Russia’s support for the Maduro regime 
as a struggle against foreign aggression that, according to him, threatens the sovereignty of both 
Venezuela and Russia.  
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Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has used similar rhetoric to justify his country’s 
support for Maduro’s government, claiming the United States has obstructed the resolution of the 
Venezuelan crisis and alleging that resolution must stem from negotiation between Maduro’s 
regime and the opposition.253 Russian President Vladimir Putin has criticized external 
interventions in Venezuela’s political affairs as well, urging the Venezuelan people be given the 
opportunity “to decide by themselves the future of their country.”254 Following this vein of 
thought and its interest in the survival of the Maduro administration, the Russian government 
swiftly proclaimed its support for Maduro after Guaidó declared he was assuming the role of 
interim president of Venezuela.255 On the one hand, Russia’s expression of support for Maduro 
draws from the Putin administration’s desire to shore up Maduro’s government because of its 
economic cooperation with Russia’s national interests and its critical perception of the United 
States.256 This anti-American attitude on the part of the Maduro regime fits well with Russia’s 
ambition to promote a multipolar world order, oppose American hegemony, and restore Russia 
to great power status.257 On the other hand, Russian officials’ attempts to couch their support for 
Maduro in terms of safeguarding Venezuela from foreign interference embodies Las Casas’s 
concern that an external intervention in a society could have such negative effects as to 
delegitimize that intervention.258  
Like the Putin administration, the Chinese government also has represented the United 
States’ involvement in the Venezuelan crisis as unjustified. When U.S. President Trump called 
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for the freezing of Venezuelan officials’ financial assets and sources of funds for the Venezuelan 
government held in the United States, the Chinese foreign ministry condemned Trump’s order 
and labeled it “gross interference” in Venezuelan affairs.259 Moreover, Chinese foreign ministry 
spokeswoman Hua Chunying demanded the United States cease exacerbating the turmoil in 
Venezuela and refrain from interfering in what the Chinese government considers Venezuela’s 
domestic affairs.260 Chinese State Councilor Wang Yi expressed his government’s rationale 
about Venezuelan sovereignty further, urging that the citizens of each state decide the course of 
their country’s domestic affairs, not foreign actors.261 He denounced the United States’ 
implementation of economic sanctions against the Maduro regime, averring such “external 
interference” would worsen the Venezuelan crisis and “allow the law of the jungle to once again 
run amok.”262 Furthermore, Wang insisted that the U.S. attempts to sanction the Maduro regime 
would continue a history of “disastrous” interventions in states’ internal affairs.263 In so doing, 
Wang echoed the Russian delegation to the UN’s 2016 statement about R2P, which noted how 
political order in Libya collapsed in the aftermath of foreign intervention whose alleged purpose 
had been to defend Libyan civilians.264  
Wang’s remarks against U.S. policies toward Venezuela, while not sufficing for a 
complete explanation of China’s motives for supporting Maduro, concur with Las Casas’s 
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argument that rulers and peoples should not be exposed to foreign political or military 
interference.265 Las Casas articulated this perspective when he insisted Native Americans could 
not be subjected lawfully to the jurisdiction of any human judge for non-Christian practices they 
carried out before converting to Catholicism.266 Although Las Casas’s writings on this topic did 
not refer to state sovereignty as it is understood in twenty-first century international relations, it 
espouses that one society should not intervene in the affairs of another society, save in limited, 
nonviolent contexts.267 Las Casas did, however, consider the Christianization of Native 
Americans more important than respecting the wishes of native rulers who might oppose such 
religious intervention in their societies’ affairs, for he did not stipulate the Spanish should refrain 
from evangelization in such instances.268 The Chinese Foreign Ministry has insisted a state’s 
government be consulted before another government intervenes in its internal affairs, despite the 
problematic nature of this stipulation in situations where a state’s government is perpetrating 
human rights abuses. In contrast to this line of thought, Las Casas supported the evangelization 
of Native Americans regardless of whether or not the Spanish obtained native rulers’ permission 
to do so.269 He wrote the Spanish monarch had a duty to spread Christianity in Native American 
lands, even in territories over which the Spanish did not exercise political control.270 By valuing 
the spread of Christianity above any Native American sovereign’s position on the subject, Las 
Casas foreshadowed the Lima Group’s position that the promotion of democracy is more 
important than respecting the will of the Maduro government.271 
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While Las Casas’s unwavering support for the promotion of Christianity in the sixteenth-
century Americas aligns with the Lima Group’s support for the promotion of democracy in 
Venezuela, Las Casas shared the Russian and Chinese concerns for averting violent effects of 
international intervention in Venezuela.272 His fervent denunciations of Spanish violence toward 
Native Americas despite the perpetrators’ allegations of their legitimacy attests to his viewpoint 
that the ends do not justify the means in international interventions.273 Las Casas, therefore, held 
to a perspective on sovereignty that corresponds to the Russian comments at the UN General 
Assembly regarding the international intervention in Libya. Just as the Russian delegation 
insisted the Libyan intervention had been a disaster despite its initial, humanitarian justification, 
Las Casas contended the Spanish intervention in Native American societies had been disastrous 
regardless of its alleged motives.274  
However, in situations where citizens are suffering and dying at the hands of their 
government, as is occurring in Venezuela, the viewpoint that no political or military intervention 
whatsoever is justified in another state’s affairs becomes immensely problematic.275 Failure to 
intervene in such a situation would deprive the international community of a means that could 
stem the human rights abuses in a country, which would likely continue to grow worse if no 
action from the international community were taken. Moreover, international interventions, 
whether they be of a political or a military nature, are not assured to intensify the suffering of a 
country’s citizens. While an intervention may result in an exacerbation of the crisis it seeks to 
resolve, such an outcome is by no means determined. Therefore, Las Casas’s repudiation of 
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political and military interventions renders his arguments on international interventions too 
restrictive regarding potential means for the international community to address abuses of human 
rights. Vitoria’s acceptance of certain justifications for international interventions, while not 
addressing human rights abuses as they are viewed in the twenty-first century, offers a more 
flexible line of thought that is more morally and practically applicable to counteracting human 
rights violations in Venezuela.276  
Certainly, the diplomatic recognition that countries and institutions like the Lima Group 
have extended to Guaidó and Venezuela’s National Assembly is not certain to lead to political 
changes that will put a stop to human rights abuses in Venezuela. Nevertheless, such diplomatic 
recognition offers the international community options for influencing the course of the 
Venezuelan crisis other than using rhetoric alone to chastise the Maduro regime, a strategy that 
would be extremely unlikely to incentivize a change in the Maduro administration’s behavior 
regarding human rights. Despite these advantages of Vitoria’s legal thought, however, Las 
Casas’s views remain important in that they underlie the potential for international interventions 
to result in more harm than they correct.277 Thus, governments should seek to craft their political 
and military modes of intervention so that, to the greatest degree possible, they avoid inflicting 
suffering on citizens who are not involved in the governmental decision-making that has 
promoted human rights violations. This mode of reasoning applies to policies such as the current 
U.S. economic sanctions against approximately 100 Venezuelans who are closely connected to 
the Maduro regime and against the Venezuelan government, state oil company Petróleos de 
Venezuela, and national bank.278 Such policies offer governments a means to motivate officials 
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in governments that are committing human rights violations to reverse their repressive policies, 
but these policies should be considered carefully to minimize the prospect that their effects will 
harm Venezuelan citizens who are not engaged in governmental decision-making. Although it 
may not always be possible to avoid harmful effects of political or military interventions on 
citizens who are not contributing to the perpetration of government policies that inflict human 
rights violations, an avoidance of such harmful effects should accompany international 
interventions. This admonition, which is in keeping with Las Casas’s views, illustrates his 
arguments’ applicability to the Venezuelan crisis, despite the fact that his arguments against 
international interventions in general – and their parallels in the arguments of Maduro, Russia, 
and China – are morally and practically less favorable than those of Vitoria with respect to the 
aim of counteracting human rights abuses. 
VI: The Responsibility to Protect in Venezuela and Las Casas’s Views of Just War 
 During his speech to the United Nations Security Council on April 10, 2019, U.S. Vice 
President Mike Pence invoked the principles of R2P with respect to Venezuela, without 
mentioning the R2P doctrine by name.279 Labeling Venezuela a “failed state” and referring to 
Maduro as “a dictator with no legitimate claim to power” who “must go,” Pence implied Maduro 
has failed to fulfill his responsibilities to protect Venezuela’s human rights.280 Furthermore, 
Pence contended that the international community should execute these responsibilities in 
Maduro’s place, claiming the United Nations must “stand up for democracy and the rule of law” 
in Venezuela.281 Thus, he couched his arguments in terms of concepts found in the 2005 World 
 
279 “Remarks by Vice President Pence at a Special Session of the United Nations Special Council on the Crisis in 
Venezuela: New York, NY,” The White House, last modified April 10, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-special-session-united-nations-security-council-crisis-venezuela-new-
york-ny/; “Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly,” United Nations General Assembly, 30. 
280 “Remarks by Vice President Pence,” The White House. 
281 Ibid. 
Clark 54 
 
Summit Outcome, which declares “the international community . . . has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means . . . to protect populations from . 
. . crimes against humanity.”282 Pence also claimed that the United States’ opposition to the 
Maduro regime and support for Guaidó reflects an intent to advance democracy and protect the 
rights of Venezuelans, not to advance U.S. interests in a selfish manner.283 These remarks are 
reminiscent of the concept of right intention in just war theory, which urges states to begin wars 
only when doing so promotes morally upright ends.284 By portraying the U.S. policy stance 
toward Maduro and Guaidó as based on right intentions, Pence depicted the United States’ 
diplomatic and rhetorical intervention in the Venezuelan political crisis as not just morally 
acceptable, but also necessary given the ongoing turmoil in Venezuela. 
U.S. President Trump elaborated on his administration’s perspective that the United 
States should influence the course of the political crisis in Venezuela during his speech in Miami, 
Florida in February 2019.285 Trump claimed, “We seek a peaceful transition to power [in 
Venezuela]. But all options are on the table,” reiterating a statement he issued in January 2019 
when asked if he would support military action against Maduro.286 By not ruling out the pursuit 
of U.S. military action in Venezuela, Trump implied such a policy decision would be a justifiable 
means of bringing an end to the Maduro regime. Trump’s tacit acceptance of military action as a 
policy option toward Venezuela resembles Sepúlveda’s acceptance of Spanish military action 
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against Native Americans as justifiable for purposes of ending practices associated with the 
polytheism practiced by indigenous peoples such as the Aztecs.287  
At the cornerstone of Sepúlveda’s argument for the Spanish use of force against the 
natives lay the claim that Native American practices that contravened natural law necessitated 
Spanish intervention in their affairs.288 Sepúlveda assured Spanish military intervention would 
“bring them [the natives] to spiritual health and the true religion,” even if that intervention 
involved warfare, despite Sepúlveda’s lack of details regarding how military intervention would 
lead to such “spiritual health”.289 Sepúlveda supplemented his argument with references to the 
ancient Israelites’ use of military force against the Canaanites as described in the Bible, asserting 
that such warfare was justified in the name of suppressing the worship of idols.290 The Trump 
administration’s statements on Venezuela have not shared Sepúlveda’s emphasis on just war 
theory given their lack of explicit references to military intervention, and the Native American 
religious practices Sepúlveda condemned do not parallel the Venezuelan government’s policies 
directly. However, Sepúlveda’s belief that Spanish military intervention to put a stop to 
violations of natural law parallel the Trump administration’s unwillingness to rule out the pursuit 
of military action in Venezuela. The Trump administration’s refusal to eliminate the possibility 
of military action indicates its tacit assumption that an American overthrow of Maduro could be 
vindicated in the name of ending the Maduro regime’s human right abuses and the suffering 
Venezuelans face under Maduro. 
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Like Sepúlveda, Las Casas agreed it was possible to justify certain wars in accordance 
with just war theory of his day.291 Nevertheless, his indefatigable denunciations of Spanish 
treatment of indigenous peoples in the Americas testify to his viewpoint that the intention to 
counter perceived offenses against natural or international law does not justify unethical means 
of doing so.292 This perspective underlies Las Casas’s condemnations of Spanish cruelty against 
the natives, which he considered totally unjustified despite Sepúlveda’s efforts to couch the 
Spanish conquest as a purgation of indigenous polytheism.293 Also, Las Casas rebuked the 
conduct by which the Spanish had conquered territories in the Americas, not accepting the 
insistence of conquistadores like Bernal Díaz del Castillo who claimed to have conducted 
conquests on behalf of God and the enlightenment of the natives.294 Las Casas’s writings on this 
subject reflect his concern for adherence to the just war principle of proportionality.295 According 
to the principle of proportionality, military action can become illegitimate if the costs of a 
military victory would outweigh any potential benefits to the intervening actor.296 The native 
peoples of the Americas suffered massive loss of life from Spanish violence and the diseases the 
Spanish unintentionally spread to them, and this loss of life serves as a poignant example of how 
severe the costs of intervening in other societies’ affairs can become.297 Therefore, the concern 
with evaluating the costs of military action illuminates Las Casas’s interpretation of the Spanish 
conquests in the Americas, underlying his conviction that such conquests had been carried out in 
a manner contrary to natural law.298 
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Las Casas’s insistence that the effects of Spanish intervention in the Americas had been 
detrimental to the natives is reminiscent of the critiques of potential U.S. military action in 
Venezuela.299 In 2019, Congressman Ro Khanna of California urged U.S. policymakers to 
“pause to ask” whether an intervention in Venezuela would “make a bad situation even 
worse.”300 Khanna noted the “human suffering” and “financial costs” of previous U.S. military 
interventions overseas and invoked the major likelihood that “chaos and bloodshed” would ensue 
in the wake of a U.S. military assault on the Maduro regime.301 Like Las Casas, Khanna did not 
argue for pacifism or a refutation of just war theory per se.302 Rather, he expressed that in order 
for a military intervention to qualify as a just war, it not only would need to seek to counteract 
injustices perpetrated by the target, but also would need to “begin an orderly transition to a new 
regime” and “improve life for Venezuelans.”303 Thus, Khanna’s and Las Casas’s views parallel 
one another on this issue, promoting the position that international intervention is not justified if 
it deprives individuals of their inherent rights or violates natural law, even if an intervention’s 
ostensible goal were to defend such rights or law.304 In situations where the political order within 
a state has been rendered unjust because of human rights violations, however, international 
interventions that adhere as closely as possible to the principle of proportionality offer the 
prospect of counteracting human rights violations. Las Casas and Khanna’s arguments, while 
rightly stressing the importance of proportionality, can be taken too far if they are used to reject 
all political and military international interventions that have not received backing from a higher 
international authority. 
 
299 Ibid., 7-8; Ro Khanna, “Why I Strongly Oppose U.S. Intervention in Venezuela,” The Washington Post, last 
modified January 30, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2019/01/30/venezuela-2/. 
300 Khanna, “Why I Strongly Oppose U.S. Intervention in Venezuela.” 
301 Ibid. 
302 Ibid. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Ibid.; Las Casas, “Destruction of the Indies,” 1-8. 
Clark 58 
 
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect displays a perspective toward the 
Venezuelan crisis that parallels Las Casas’s arguments about international interventions. The 
Global Centre has claimed U.S. sanctions against Venezuela constitute a likely threat to 
Venezuelans’ ability to obtain crucial goods, although Venezuelans’ access to key goods has 
already been scarce and the most recent U.S. sanctions only target approximately 100 
Venezuelans directly.305 Thus, the Global Centre shares Las Casas’s viewpoint that international 
interventions must not harm the livelihood of the people they affect, even if such interventions’ 
ostensible aim is to resolve other societies’ crises. The Global Centre’s article on the Venezuelan 
crisis follows up its comment concerning U.S. sanctions by calling on UN member states to 
employ targeted sanctions that would harm only Venezuelan government officials who have 
violated Venezuelans’ human rights, despite the difficulty of ensuring the sanctions would 
impact only such officials.306  
Continuing on, the Global Centre urges UN member states to ensure the measures they 
take to pressure the Maduro regime do not “further limit the [Venezuelan] population’s access to 
basic goods and essential services.”307 These statements illustrate the Global Centre does not just 
call for sovereign states to uphold their obligations to protect citizens’ human rights. Rather, the 
Global Centre also considers the international community must not violate human rights when 
attempting to promote change in a government’s policies. Still, the status quo in a country like 
Venezuela is not always preferable to a political or military intervention, for international 
interventions may lead to increased suffering for a state’s citizens, but citizens who suffer human 
rights abuses may not face realistic chances for improvements in their predicament from a 
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continuation of the status quo. Therefore, Las Casas and the Global Centre’s mindset regarding 
international interventions should be qualified by the notion that failure to intervene politically or 
militarily in a case of human rights violations is likely to assure the continuation of the very 
injustices Las Casas sought to avoid in international interventions. 
The Global Centre’s mentality regarding intervention in Venezuela harkens back to Las 
Casas’s arguments regarding the Spanish conquests in the Americas, for it shares his belief that 
states have a responsibility to avoid the violation of legal and moral conditions that constrain 
non-military interventions in other societies’ affairs. When Las Casas portrayed Native 
Americans as “excellently fit to receive” Roman Catholicism, he indicated his perspective that 
Spaniards were justified in their attempts to convert the natives, and he did not condition this 
viewpoint on native rulers’ willingness to permit Christian evangelism in their territories.308 
Describing “a good Christian man” who felt “moved by pity” to convert natives on a Caribbean 
island most of whose population had died of European disease, Las Casas attested to his notion 
that the Spanish had a responsibility to spread Christianity in the Americas.309 His writings 
advanced the viewpoint that non-military interventions in other societies must remain focused on 
their ostensible justifications and must not pursue unjust courses of action.310 While Las Casas’s 
concerned himself with the Spaniards’ obligations to preach Christian doctrines, not twenty-first-
century concepts of human rights that the Maduro regime has violated in Venezuela, his views 
show similarity to the notions of the R2P doctrine, which serves as an evolved manifestation of 
international legal principles Las Casas invoked. 
 
308 Las Casas, “Destruction of the Indies,” 6. 
309 Ibid., 7. 
310 Ibid., 1-8. 
Clark 60 
 
Another way in which Las Casas’s arguments foreshadow the perspectives of Ro Khanna 
and the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect comes from Las Casas’s denunciations of 
the manner in which the Spanish intervened in Native American societies. Las Casas focused 
much of his ire against Spaniards who received encomiendas – grants of Native Americans’ 
forced labor and tribute allocated to a Spaniard in exchange for a pledge to convert the natives to 
Christianity.311 Las Casas depicted encomenderos, as those who held encomiendas were called, 
as hypocrites because they claimed they would spread Catholicism to the natives, but their 
actions revealed the majority of them were in fact “avaricious and filled with vice,” according to 
Las Casas.312 By labeling these Spaniards’ conduct toward the natives as unjustified, Las Casas 
argued international interventions must be predicated on more than just a claim of good 
intentions if it is to be considered truly just. He even contended that the natives “always waged 
the most just and defensible war against the Christians,” maintaining polities and societies have a 
right to defend themselves against an intervening force, particularly if the intervening party’s 
ostensible aims serve as a cover for unjust motives.313 This standpoint places Las Casas in line 
with the notion from just war theory that combatants must have “right intention” when waging 
war, and that they cannot rightly use force if they seek self-aggrandizement and not the 
resolution of injustice and harm.314 Therefore, Las Casas disapproved of attempts to justify uses 
of force through concealments of underlying, unjust motives, just as Chávez disapproved of the 
possibility for R2P to become a convenient justification for preemptive attacks based on 
governments’ political, economic, or military ambitions.315 
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VII. Final Analysis and Conclusion 
 If the governments that have declared their support for Guaidó had sought to justify their 
actions in Venezuela with the authorization of a higher international authority like the United 
Nations, as occurred during the Korean War (1950-1953), their means of action would have 
better approximated Las Casas’s perspective on international interventions. After all, Las Casas 
described Pope Alexander VI’s decision to grant the monarch of Castile spiritual authority over 
the Americas as a legitimate act, portraying it as having granted proper sanction to Spanish 
colonization and evangelization in the Americas.316 Therefore, Las Casas believed one 
government could influence the internal affairs of another country, so long as that influence 
remained limited to a spiritual intervention or had the approval of a higher international 
authority.317 Las Casas never condoned the usurpation of a ruler’s political authority by another 
sovereign acting without papal authorization.318 He contended the Spanish should not interfere 
unilaterally to usurp the political authority or property rights of Native American sovereigns, and 
he considered native authority and property rights inviolate under natural law.319 Not only did he 
condemn violent attempts to subjugate Native Americans to Spanish rule, but he also wrote 
native rulers and peoples could not be punished if they chose not to accept the Spanish monarch 
as their sovereign lord, even if they converted to Catholicism.320 This stipulation testifies to Las 
Casas’s lack of support for international interventions in which one government would try to 
pressure another government to submit to its political will or would interfere in the internal 
politics of another country without its government’s consent.  
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Las Casas qualified his recognition of Native American rulers’ sovereignty with the 
assertion of supreme papal authority over the peoples of the world and his belief that the Spanish 
monarchy wielded just authority to propagate Catholicism in the Americas.321 Although he 
portrayed papal authority as higher than that of Native American rulers, he represented native 
rulers as legitimate authorities within their territories and did not characterize the papal 
authorization of Spanish colonization as a delegitimization of native rulers’ sovereignty.322 When 
Las Casas spoke of the authority figures in Native American societies whom he claimed could 
wield sovereignty, he referred to kings and lords who, according to him, had a right to govern 
because of their noble status.323 Las Casas’s notion of sovereignty as extending from the top 
down in Native American societies differentiates him from the positions of governments that 
back the Venezuelan opposition today. For example, Spanish Prime Minister Sánchez’s 
comment that the Venezuelan people must decide the country’s future implies the Venezuelan 
people hold the highest sovereignty within their country, which extends from individual citizens 
to their representatives in the National Assembly.324 This concept would have been unimaginable 
in Las Casas, Vitoria, and Sepúlveda’s day, seeing as these Spaniards lived too long before the 
emergence of Enlightenment liberalism to share the perception that the citizens of a country 
wield ultimate sovereignty, not their rulers. Likewise, the Lima Group insisted the Maduro 
regime must restore democratic government in Venezuela and recognized the National Assembly 
as Venezuela’s legitimate political authority because its members were elected democratically.325 
Las Casas, in contrast, did not describe the populations of a state as exercising a higher authority 
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than its rulers. Even if he had done so, he opposed unilateral interferences in Native American 
polities’ political affairs.326 Las Casas believed the Spanish lacked sufficient authority to 
influence the government of another society except through Christian evangelization or the 
nonviolent assumption of political authority in keeping with papal authorization.327 
Given Las Casas’s views regarding the importance of preserving rulers’ sovereignty from 
external interference that was not sanctioned by a higher international authority than the state, 
the governments that seek to influence the political situation in Venezuela through their support 
for Guaidó are not in keeping with Las Casas’s views on international interventions.328 Granted, 
U.S. Vice President Pence’s speech on April 10, 2019 and the Lima Group’s call for Maduro to 
forfeit a second term as Venezuelan president and assert the sovereignty of the National 
Assembly, which is just as much a part of the Venezuelan government as Maduro’s executive 
branch.329 These statements express governments’ support for one side in the Venezuelan 
political crisis over another, an inevitable development that motivates governments’ involvement 
in the Venezuelan crisis and the diplomatic recognition many governments have extended to 
Guaidó. Such calls for Maduro to step down and diplomatic recognitions of Guaidó do not 
conform to Las Casas’s opposition to intervention in political affairs of a sovereign polity that 
has not been sanctioned by a higher international authority.330 Also, the appeals to an implicit 
higher law that appear in the statements of governments that support Guaidó, while reminiscent 
of Las Casas’s appeals to a natural law, refer to those governments’ support for democratic 
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values and institutions, rather than the notion of natural law and papal authority to which Las 
Casas ascribed.331  
 These considerations reveal Las Casas’s arguments concerning international intervention 
do not lend themselves well to the means by which the coalition of countries that support Guaidó 
have attempted to influence the political crisis in Venezuela. However, Las Casas’s emphasis 
that governments must protect the population over which they rule lends itself to ongoing 
concerns over the Venezuelan government’s policies toward its citizens. Given the differences 
between Las Casas’s historical context and the historical context of the ongoing Venezuelan 
crisis, Las Casas’s notions of protecting citizens does not correspond exactly to twenty-first 
century interpretations of human rights.332 After all, the responsibility to protect that underlies 
the arguments of NGOs like Amnesty International and the Global Centre for the Responsibility 
to Protect stems from the argument that governments have a responsibility to uphold justice 
toward their citizens, as Las Casas articulated in his Brevísima relación.333 Las Casas’s belief 
that the Spanish should preach Christianity to indigenous peoples in the Americas lends itself to 
a parallel between his views of international interventions and the more secular views of twenty-
first-century NGOs.334 Just as these NGOs consider the international community to have a 
responsibility to promote human rights in Venezuela, Las Casas considered the spread of 
Christianity an important goal for the Spanish to undertake, believing Christian evangelization 
would benefit the natives and justifying it even if the Spanish were to lack political authority in 
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indigenous peoples’ lands.335 This underlying religious component of Las Casas’s perspective on 
international responsibility distinguishes him from twenty-first-century NGOs and governments 
that make secular arguments about international responsibility toward Venezuela. Nevertheless, 
Las Casas held to the viewpoint that certain efforts by governments and international institutions 
– in his case, the Spanish monarchy and the Roman Catholic Church – are justified in promoting 
certain sociopolitical goals in foreign sovereigns’ territory.336 In the twenty-first century, this line 
of thought extends itself to the viewpoint that states and international organizations can justly 
espouse human rights in other countries, operating under the principle that these rights are both 
desirable and of crucial importance globally. 
Thus, Las Casas’s arguments share a parallel assumption with the arguments of NGOs 
like Amnesty International and governments that support Juan Guaidó’s claim to the Venezuelan 
presidency, such as the United Kingdom.337 These NGOs and governments believe certain 
political and social goals – particularly the promotion of human rights as they are viewed in a 
Western, twenty-first century sense – are so crucial that governments and international 
organizations have a duty to advance them in countries where human rights are at risk amid 
political violence.338 Las Casas’s views paralleled this line of thinking in part, since he 
considered the Spanish monarchy to have a duty to promote the spread of Christianity in 
indigenous sovereigns’ territories.339 However, his writings did not advocate policies that would 
support rival factions in another country’s political crisis or seek to enact political change in a 
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way that he believed would cause individuals more harm than benefit.340 Las Casas’s depiction 
of a Spanish massacre of civilians in the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlán serves as a case in point. 
In 1520, Pedro de Alvarado, the lieutenant of Spanish conquistador Hernán Cortés, led a group 
of conquistadores in an attack on unarmed citizens of Tenochtitlán during a religious festival.341  
The Spaniards had attempted to overturn the polytheism of the Aztecs by burning Aztec idols 
and placing an image of the Virgin Mary in the city’s great temple.342 While Las Casas could 
have construed the Spaniards’ actions, particularly the Spanish destruction of Aztec religious 
images, as justifiable means to promote his desired ends of the natives’ Christianization, he 
harshly condemned the Spaniards’ treatment of the natives instead.343  
This example illustrates Las Casas’s view that international interventions in the political 
and social affairs of other societies are not necessarily justified because their ostensible aims 
align with goals one might perceive as universally desirable. In order for international 
intervention to be justified, according to Las Casas, an international authority above an 
individual state should provide permission for intervention to begin.344 In Las Casas’s view, that 
authority resided in the papacy, and in the context of the Venezuelan crisis the United Nations 
would serve as a parallel international authority.345 In the case of Venezuela, the prospect of 
official UN support for intervention in Venezuela is extremely unlikely given Russia and China’s 
ability to veto any potential UN Security Council condemnations of Maduro’s regime and its 
human rights abuses. The lack of official UN sanction for governments’ endorsement of Juan 
Guaidó lends itself to the conclusion that governments’ unilateral assertions of Guaidó’s 
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legitimacy do not correspond to Las Casas’s arguments about international interventions. Las 
Casas opposed policies that exacerbated a politically tense situation and resulted in atrocities 
against civilians, such as the Spanish massacre under Alvarado’s leadership.346 Given that 
governments’ support for Guaidó has not led to a resolution of Venezuela’s economic crisis or 
political turmoil, Las Casas likely would have viewed such support with skepticism since the 
political tensions in Venezuela have remained severe throughout Guaidó’s bid for the 
Venezuelan presidency.347 
In conclusion, Las Casas’s views illustrated the notion of proportionality in international 
interventions and the admonition that such interventions be predicated on justification from a 
higher international authority. Las Casas’s support for proportionality is especially applicable in 
the case of the Venezuelan crisis. International involvement in the Venezuelan crisis, particularly 
through governments’ diplomatic recognition of Guaidó, U.S. economic sanctions against 
Venezuelan officials, and the unlikely prospect of U.S. military intervention in Venezuela, 
should be taken in a form that does not inflict harm on Venezuela’s citizens. Rather, such 
involvement in the crisis should be predicated on a goal of pressuring the Venezuelan 
government to alleviate its human rights abuses without worsening the plight of Venezuelan 
citizens. Las Casas’s denunciations of unjust Spanish treatment of Native Americans during the 
sixteenth century lend his arguments about proportionality in international interventions to the 
Venezuelan crisis well, for proportionality should underlie all international efforts at intervention 
in the Venezuelan crisis. The prospect of military intervention in Venezuela stands a particularly 
unclear chance of improving the situation in that country for Venezuelan citizens, and any 
potential military action has not endured the scrutiny that just war theory would demand with 
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respect to a war’s likelihood of achieving its aims.348 Thus, military action at the present time is 
not an advisable strategy to address the crisis in Venezuela, although it could be justified if it 
were carried out with respect to proportionality, stood a likely chance at alleviating human rights 
violations, and served as the principal, viable option for resolving the crisis.  
Despite Las Casas’s views’ applicability to the principle of proportionality, his views 
concerning the need for a higher international authority to justify international involvement are 
problematic with respect to the Venezuelan crisis. The authorization of an international body 
other than a state’s government, such as the United Nations Security Council, would provide a 
helpful sense of legitimacy to an international intervention in Venezuela. However, the extreme 
unlikelihood of such authorization occurring renders it crucial that intervention in the 
Venezuelan crisis be pursued by other means, for the international community should seek to 
pressure the Maduro regime to change its course of action with respect to human rights in 
Venezuela. By demanding that international interventions be predicated on a higher international 
authorization than that of a state’s government or that of a coalition of states, Las Casas’s 
articulation of the justifications of interventions is too limiting for the context of the Venezuelan 
crisis.  
Given this weakness of Las Casas’s argument and his limiting renunciation of 
international interventions of a political and military character, Vitoria’s arguments in favor of 
certain political interventions should be coupled with Las Casas’s arguments about 
proportionality and applied to the Venezuelan crisis. Unlike Las Casas, Vitoria did not argue 
international interventions had to receive approval from a higher international authority than the 
state to be legitimate, so long as they were conducted in accordance with natural law.349 His 
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acceptance of justifications for political interventions applies well to the Venezuelan crisis, in 
which governments’ diplomatic recognition of Guaidó has served as an attempted means to 
promote political change in Venezuela that stands a change of resulting in an alleviation of 
human rights abuses in that country. With these factors in mind, a combination of Las Casas’s 
views regarding proportionality in international interventions and Vitoria’s views in favor of 
justifications for certain international interventions that do not have to possess the blessing of a 
higher international authority enjoy excellent moral and practical applicability to the Venezuelan 
crisis. Therefore, the strategies that best exemplify these principles, such as the extension of 
diplomatic recognition to Guaidó and political and economic support to the Venezuelan 
opposition, have greater moral and practical applicability to the Venezuelan crisis than efforts 
such as military intervention, whose impact on the Venezuelan crisis is not only uncertain, but 
likely to lead to harm for Venezuelan citizens. For this reason, Sepúlveda’s arguments regarding 
Spanish colonization in the Americas, which focus so strongly on Spanish military interventions 
against Native American societies, have less applicability to the current Venezuelan crisis than 
do those of Las Casas and Vitoria. Moreover, Sepúlveda lack of attention to proportionality, in 
comparison to Las Casas and Vitoria, renders his writings more morally and practically 
questionable than Las Casas and Vitoria’s views regarding international interventions. Without 
sufficient attention paid to proportionality, Sepúlveda’s writings do not take an adequate account 
of the prospect that international interventions can worsen the plight of citizens who are suffering 
human rights violations if they are not carried out in a way that is proportional to the abuses they 
seek to address.  
Although the diplomatic endorsement Guaidó has received from more than fifty countries 
has not produced an end to the crisis nor the Maduro regime’s human rights abuses, the 
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diplomatic recognition of Guaidó has allowed governments to do more to affect the course of the 
crisis than just condemn Maduro. Moreover, continued international support for the Venezuelan 
opposition is important because it maintains the diplomatic pressure on the Maduro regime, 
illustrating that the regime will face diplomatic repercussions for its continued abuses of human 
rights. While this prospect does not guarantee a resolution of the Venezuelan crisis, it allows 
countries to strike a middle tone between merely denouncing Maduro and launching a risky and 
not-well-analyzed military intervention in Venezuela. By promoting the Venezuelan opposition’s 
efforts to produce political change in Venezuela, governments and international organizations 
can strike a balance between totally refraining from international intervention in the face of 
human rights abuses and engaging in international intervention that may not exhibit the 
proportionality that Las Casas and Vitoria championed. While governments’ recognition of 
Guaidó does not align with Las Casas’s arguments in general, it does not contradict Las Casas’s 
arguments in favor of proportionality and is in keeping with the argument that a combination of 
Las Casas and Vitoria’s views enjoys the greatest applicability to the Venezuelan crisis. 
This thesis’s analysis of the parallels between Las Casas’s writings and international legal 
arguments against the Maduro regime’s legitimacy illustrates how Las Casas’s political thought 
can help scholars better understand the international legal arguments employed in the current 
Venezuelan crisis. Also, the misalignment between Las Casas’s views and the tactics of 
governments that have recognized Guaidó as Venezuela’s president offers a timely case study of 
how certain themes of sovereignty and sovereigns’ responsibilities have evolved and even eroded 
over time and align imperfectly with twenty-first-century notions of the responsibility to 
protect.350 Certainly, the nearly five centuries of difference between the historical and political 
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contexts of Las Casas’s day and those of the ongoing Venezuelan crisis call into question 
dogmatic pronouncements of whether or not Las Casas personally would have approved of 
various international actors’ arguments and behavior concerning the political tensions in 
Venezuela. Still, the document’s comparison of Las Casas’s views on international interventions 
with those of present-day governments and organizations provides a helpful historical, 
philosophical, and theoretical context for discussions of international legal arguments that pertain 
to the Venezuelan crisis. More importantly, the thesis demonstrates the value of Las Casas in 
current efforts to establish norms and guidelines for international interventions with respect to 
the Venezuelan crisis. 
Moreover, Las Casas’s views on international political interventions offer an alternative 
approach to answering questions of when, in what ways, and for what reasons countries have the 
right and the obligation to intervene in other countries’ political crises. Questions on this matter 
not only drive further understanding of Las Casas’s views on international interventions of his 
own time, but also encourage a more critical perspective regarding present-day arguments that 
favor or oppose the political aims of Guaidó and Maduro. In particular, Las Casas’s emphasis on 
a state’s need to obtain higher international authorization before asserting its political authority 
outside of its territory remains relevant to international controversies like the Venezuelan crisis. 
The presentation of Las Casas’s views on international authorization for interventions lends itself 
to international legal, prudential, and ethical questions about the extent to which present-day 
international authoritative bodies, such as the UN Security Council, should have a say before 
governments provide diplomatic or economic support to politicians in other countries, 
particularly during times of political turmoil in such countries. 
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The thesis’s findings about Las Casas’s political thought and the extent to which his 
perspectives align with present-day notions of sovereignty and the responsibility to protect can 
contribute to scholarly and political discourse about unique means by which governments and 
NGOs could alter their present policies toward Venezuela. Finally, the study of Las Casas’s 
political thought in the context of the Venezuelan crisis invites scholars to posit new questions 
about the degree to which Vitoria and Sepúlveda’s political arguments show parallels with the 
responsibility to protect and can be applied to current international crises. Thus, the thesis serves 
to stir additional scholarly investigation of the historical precedents for international legal 
arguments that are pertinent to crises in which individuals are at risk for potential crimes against 
humanity. Such research can spur more critical analysis of present-day international legal 
arguments and offer additional insights into the political thought of international legal scholars of 
the past. 
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Appendix 
Sepúlveda’s Political Arguments 
• Sepúlveda considered the indigenous peoples of the Americas naturally inferior to the 
Spaniards, employing the writings of Aristotle to support this notion. 
• He espoused the Spanish conquest of Native Americans, regarding it as an effective 
means to subject indigenous peoples to an allegedly superior tutor. 
• He viewed the papal grant of political authority over the Americas to Holy Roman 
Emperor Charles V as legitimate, and he considered Spanish military action against 
Native Americans as a legitimate exercise of this authority. 
• Moreover, Sepúlveda believed the Spanish had a responsibility to use military force to 
put an end to offenses against natural law, particularly human sacrifice.  
• Sepúlveda also thought the Spanish had the right to use military force against Native 
Americans to prevent them from continuing to practice non-Christian religions and 
spiritual traditions. 
Las Casas’s Political Arguments 
• Las Casas’s critiques of all attempts at political or military intervention in Native 
American societies drew from his repulsion at the Spaniards’ abusive treatment of native 
peoples. 
• He argued the Spanish government did not have the right to intervene militarily or 
politically in Native American societies without the authorization of the papacy. 
• Furthermore, Las Casas considered Native American rulers the legitimate political 
authorities within their societies, believing the Spanish had no right to wrest authority 
from them unilaterally. 
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• Also, Las Casas’s rejected military intervention even if its goal was to stop human 
sacrifice, intending to avoid a situation in which an intervention might cause more 
suffering than it would succeed in stopping. 
• Las Casas instead championed peaceful evangelization in the Americas, condemning the 
offenses against natural law carried out during the Spanish conquests of the Caribbean 
and the Aztec Empire. 
Vitoria’s Political Arguments 
• Unlike Las Casas and Sepúlveda, Vitoria rejected the notion that the Pope could confer 
sovereignty over Native Americans on Charles V. 
• He promoted the idea that states are sovereign over their own affairs and should not be 
subjected to military intervention or political interference in their affairs because of 
religious differences. 
• Also, Vitoria disapproved of military interventions to protect non-Catholic peoples within 
a foreign sovereign’s territory. 
• However, Vitoria disagreed with Las Casas in that he considered military intervention 
legitimate if it protected international trade rights and rights of communication. 
• Finally, Vitoria believed the Spanish had the right to intervene in another state militarily 
to support Catholics who wished to replace their ruler with a Catholic sovereign. 
Arguments that Align with Sepúlveda 
• The R2P doctrine’s justification for military intervention in a state for the purpose of 
halting human rights abuses aligns quite well with Sepúlveda’s arguments in favor of 
military intervention to prevent human sacrifice. 
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• U.S. President Trump’s threat of military action against Venezuela, while not 
exemplifying the R2P doctrine per se, implies military interventions are an acceptable 
means to produce political change in a country and thus avert more violations of human 
rights by the target government. 
• While Sepúlveda grounded his arguments in favor of Spanish military intervention 
against Native Americans in religious arguments and notions of natural law that do not 
align exactly with twenty-first century notions of human rights, his views on this subject 
serve as precedents for the rationale behind the R2P doctrine. 
• Ironically, despite this similarity between Sepúlveda’s thought, the R2P doctrine, and 
more general justifications for humanitarian intervention, Sepúlveda’s overall political 
thought has not received as much support as that of Las Casas or Vitoria; after all, he 
defended his views with arguments that alleged Native Americans were inherently 
inferior to the Spanish. 
Arguments that Align with Las Casas 
• Las Casas’s opposition to Spanish military intervention in Native American societies, 
even for the purposes of putting an end to human sacrifice, aligns his views more closely 
to the arguments of Maduro, China, and Russia than do either Sepúlveda or Vitoria. 
• The reasons for which Las Casas opposed unilateral Spanish attempts to influence 
indigenous peoples’ politics by non-military or military means reflect his concern for 
avoiding potential harm such outside influence might inflict on innocent individuals.  
• Also, Las Casas’s viewpoint approximates the argument Ro Khanna made in his article 
rejecting U.S. military intervention against Venezuela, portraying such an intervention as 
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a violation of the principle of proportionality, which calls for military action to not 
produce harm that exceeds the wrongs it is meant to address. 
• Las Casas’s support for the notion that sovereigns have inviolate responsibilities toward 
the populations they govern aligns with the arguments of governments and international 
organizations that oppose the Maduro regime because of the regime’s violence toward 
civilians and its violations of Venezuelans’ human rights. 
Arguments that Align with Vitoria 
• Vitoria’s political thought strikes a balance between the arguments of Sepúlveda and Las 
Casas in that Vitoria outlines a set of limited justifications for political and military 
intervention in a state’s affairs. 
• Of these three Spaniards, Vitoria aligns the closest to the predominant understanding of 
international interventions’ proper place in the international system prior to the 
development of the R2P doctrine in the wake of the Rwandan genocide and the Balkan 
wars of the 1990s.  
• By portraying international intervention as intended to halt infringements on international 
peace and security, such as unjustified restrictions on international trade, Vitoria’s 
political thought parallels the perspective that international interventions should not be 
employed if offenses against natural law or human rights were restricted to the citizens of 
a single country. 
• While Vitoria did not espouse political or military interventions against governments 
solely because of their abuses of citizens’ human rights, he did promote an early notion of 
popular sovereignty in that he believed a country’s population had the right to invite 
foreign intervention if they wished to be governed by a Catholic ruler. 
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• Thus, Vitoria’s arguments exhibit similarities with the claims of governments and 
international organizations that assert the Venezuelan people, not Maduro, wield ultimate 
sovereignty and have the right to seek a different political path for their country. 
Ethical and Practical Merits of Sepúlveda, Las Casas,  
and Vitoria’s Arguments in the Venezuelan Crisis 
• While Sepúlveda’s views advocate military action to put a stop to violations of natural 
law, his racist attitude toward Native Americans and his espousal of international 
intervention as punishment for natives’ religious views renders his arguments morally 
inferior to those of Las Casas or Vitoria. 
•  Sepúlveda’s arguments could be employed to justify military action in the name of 
compelling one culture to adopt the practices or beliefs of another, a prospect inconsistent 
with international principles of human rights. 
• The suffering that is replete among Venezuela’s citizenry and the violations of human 
rights by the Maduro regime, including its killing of protestors and crackdowns on the 
political opposition, demand an international response. 
• Las Casas’s rejection of political or military interventions for humanitarian purposes 
renders his views on interventions less morally desirable than Vitoria’s acceptance of 
political interventions that aim to correct violations of natural law, for the international 
community should not sit idly by while Venezuelans continue to suffer abuses of human 
rights. 
• However, Las Casas’s views do offer morally and practically helpful insight into the need 
for right intentions behind international intervention in Venezuela, as well as the need for 
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such intervention to have a realistic chance of promoting political change or punishing 
violators of human rights in Venezuela. 
• For example, it is unclear that military action against the Maduro regime would resolve 
the political turmoil in Venezuela, and such action might even worsen the situation in 
Venezuela.  
• Thus, Las Casas’s arguments can serve to draw scholars and politicians’ attention to the 
need for reflection and restraint when addressing options for intervention in Venezuela, 
with the aim of minimizing Venezuelans’ suffering to the maximum possible degree.  
• At the same time, Vitoria’s arguments lend themselves better to the prospect of 
alleviating Venezuelans’ suffering overall, for Las Casas’s opposition to political and 
military interventions deprived his arguments of means that may be needed to correct 
violations of human rights if a country’s internal crisis only continues to worsen. 
Conclusions 
• The means by which governments that support Guaidó have attempted to influence 
political developments in Venezuela do not align with Las Casas’s arguments, although 
their arguments about the responsibilities of sovereigns do align with Las Casas’s 
arguments. 
• Vitoria’s political thought aligns best with the means by which governments have 
supported Guaidó, for his views in favor of a form of popular sovereignty in which the 
population of a state can appeal for a new ruler parallel the arguments that the 
Venezuelan people hold sovereignty over Maduro, not the other way around. 
• Also, Vitoria’s arguments align more closely with the principles of just war theory than 
do Las Casas’s views, for while Las Casas indicated the importance of proportionality in 
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constraining the use of force, he did not afford the justifications for military action that 
Vitoria employed in accordance with principles from just war theory. 
• Las Casas’s, Vitoria’s, and Sepúlveda’s views are important to the Venezuelan crisis 
because they provide parallels that can help scholars better contextualize and understand 
the arguments that the Maduro government, the Venezuelan opposition, and governments 
on both sides of the crisis have used to support or oppose international intervention in 
Venezuela. 
• Also, in the context of the Venezuelan crisis both a potential military intervention and 
further economic sanctions against the Maduro regime would need to have clear goals for 
achieving their intended aims and realistic prospects for successfully counteracting the 
human rights violations in Venezuela, a difficult goal to achieve through sanctions 
targeted at government officials. 
• Thus, Las Casas’s views on proportionality provide a better practical and moral argument 
for the importance of ensuring sanctions and potential military action do not inadvertently 
exacerbate the suffering in Venezuela, compared to Vitoria’s views. 
• At the same time, Vitoria’s views on self-determination and justifications for political 
intervention in humanitarian crises offer a better moral argument than Las Casas’s views 
when it comes to counteracting abuses of human rights. 
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